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THE ROLE OF NEPA IN FOSSIL FUEL 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND USE IN 
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.* 
Abstract: The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has become a 
legal tool used to slow or prevent the development and use of energy in 
the United States. This Article reviews the elements of NEPA that are 
most important in energy project compliance. It then examines recent 
NEPA case law regarding energy projects in the western United States, in-
cluding the integration of climate change analysis into the NEPA process. 
This Article focuses specifically on NEPA compliance by the Department 
of Energy and the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the 
Interior, and concludes that federal agencies are susceptible to NEPA 
challenges against energy development projects. 
Introduction 
 The nation’s use of fossil fuel results in obvious benefits as well as 
adverse environmental and economic impacts—for example, the na-
tion’s petroleum consumption is a significant contributor to the U.S. 
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trade deficit.1 Nevertheless, the United States has no discernible com-
prehensive energy policy. The United States is the third most populated 
nation in the world,2 and has the highest population growth rate of any 
developed nation3 (with a population increase of more than sixty-two 
million between 1990 and 2012).4 Moreover, as of 2005, the United 
States used energy on a per capita basis that was 4.4 times the world av-
erage and the seventh highest of developed nations.5 In 2009, oil con-
sumption in the United States reached 18.69 million barrels per day 
(mb/d),6 which is 21.8 percent of the 85.6 mb/d world demand.7 Per 
capita use of electric power in the United States was 5.25 times the 
world per capita use and 1.39 times the per capita use found in high-
income countries in 2005.8 Fossil fuel provides eighty-five percent of all 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Stacy C. Davis et al., Center for Transp. Analysis, Transportation Energy 
Data Book 1-10 fig. 1.5 (29th ed. 2010). The cost of oil dependency to the U.S. economy 
in 2009 was almost $300 billion. Id. 
2 Current World Population, Nations Online Project, http://www.nationsonline.org/ 
oneworld/world_population.htm#Top20 (last visited Apr. 26, 2012). In October 2010, 
China had a population of over 1.3 billion, India had a population of nearly 1.2 billion, 
and the U.S. population was 309.6 million. Id. 
3 See Population Growth Rate (2008) by Country, NationMaster, http://www.nationmaster. 
com/graph/peo_pop_gro_rat-population-growth-rate&date=2008 (last visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
The U.S. growth rate in 2008 was 0.883%, China’s was 0.629%, and India’s was 1.578%. Id. 
4 See Davis et al., supra note 1, at 8-2 tbl.8.1 (the 1990 population was 250.132 million); 
Bureau of the Census, National Totals: Vintage 2011 (2012), available at http://www. 
census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/2011/index.html (the 2012 population was esti-
mated at nearly 313 million). 
5 See Energy and Resources—Energy Consumption: Total Energy Consumption Per Capita, World 
Res. Inst., http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/energy-resources/variable-351.html (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2012). In 2005, energy consumption per capita in kilograms of oil equivalent was 
1,778.0 for the world, 7,885.9 for the United States, and 12,209.4 for Iceland. Id. 
6 Oil - Consumption, Index Mundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=us&v=91 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
7 IEA Oil Market Report - 14 March 2012, Oil Mkt. Reports, http://omrpublic.iea.org/ 
world/wb_wodem.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (providing a report by the International 
Energy Agency on the world’s oil product demand). 
8 See Energy and Resources - Electricity: Electricity Consumption Per Capita, World Res. Inst., 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/results.php?years=2005-2005&variable_ID=57 
4&theme=6&cID=190&ccID=0 (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (per capita use of electricity in 
2005 in kilowatt hours was 2,595.7 for the world and 13,635.7 for the United States); Energy 
and Resources—Electricity: Electricity Consumption per capita, World Res. Inst., http://earth 
trends.wri.org/searchable_db/results.php?years=2005-2005&variable_ID=574&theme=6 
&cID=190&ccID=11 (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (per capita use of electricity in 2005 in 
kilowatt hours was 9,789 for high-income countries and 13,635.7 for the United States). 
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the energy used in the United States and generates two-thirds of the 
nation’s electric power.9 This use of fossil fuel may not be sustainable.10 
 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) can be viewed as a 
tool to pressure the federal government to develop an energy policy 
that is sustainable. NEPA is frequently used in conjunction with the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), environmental statutes, and other 
substantive energy laws to stop or delay fossil energy development. A 
motivation behind the strategic use of NEPA includes increasing the 
costs and unpredictability of fossil fuel development in order to make 
alternative energy a more attractive option. This Article will focus pri-
marily on the use of NEPA to challenge energy-related projects in the 
western United States. It will address the relevant NEPA requirements 
and will discuss the recent cases shaping the law on this subject. NEPA 
requirements apply to actions of the federal government, which in-
cludes actions involving land owned by the federal government. Be-
cause much of the land in the western United States is federally owned, 
NEPA may have significant influence over energy policy decisions in 
the western United States.11 This Article begins with an overview of 




9 Energy and Utilities Research Center: Statistics, Plunkett Research, Ltd., http://www. 
plunkettresearchonline.com/ResearchCenter/Statistics/display.aspx?Industry=11 (open 
“Select topic” drop down menu; then select “2. U.S. Energy Industry Overview 2010”) (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2012); Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
10 See Alfred J. Cavallo, Hubbert’s Petroleum Production Model: An Evaluation and Implica-
tions for World Oil Production Forecasts, 13 Nat. Resources Res. 211, 211 (2004). 
11 See generally infra Parts V, VI, VII and VIII. The most relevant federal agencies are the 
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of the Interior (Interior), particularly 
Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM). DOE is a major source of funding for re-
search and development of advanced coal-fueled power systems, carbon capture and stor-
age technologies, and electricity reliability and energy management efforts, including grid 
modernization. Office of Chief Fin. Officer, Dep’t of Energy, DOE/CF-0064, FY 2012 
Congressional Budget Request: Budget Highlights 3 (2012). DOE’s Office of Elec-
tricity Delivery and Energy Reliability requested $238 million in their 2012 budget request. 
Id. at 9. DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy requested $475.982 million, which is a substantial 
drop from its $672.383 million 2011 budget. Id. at 51. 
Interior’s importance is due to the federal government’s ownership of 31.1% of the 
nation’s land. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, BLM/BC/ST-
99/001+1165, Public Land Statistics 1998, at tbl.1-3 (1999), available at http://www. 
blm.gov/public_land_statistics/pls98/98PL1-3.pdf (using statistics from fiscal year 1997). 
In the western United States, the federal government owns over 563 million acres that 
make up 44.1% of Arizona, 44.7% of California, 36.3% of Colorado, 62.3% of Idaho, 
27.3% of Montana, 79.8% of Nevada, 33.7% of New Mexico, 51.6% of Oregon, 64.3% of 
Utah, 28% of Washington, and 49.5% of Wyoming. Id. The BLM has exclusive jurisdiction 
over nearly 248 million acres, primarily in the West, which gives it a major role in energy 
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NEPA and then evaluates how courts apply NEPA’s regulatory require-
ments for projects involving energy development.12 It concludes by es-
tablishing the susceptibility of federal agencies to NEPA challenges re-
garding future energy development projects, especially in light of 
climate change developments. 
I. NEPA Overview 
 NEPA was signed into law on January 1, 1970.13 The original ver-
sion of NEPA consisted of only five pages, but over the ensuing years it 
more than tripled in size.14 These expansions, however, did not materi-
ally change the Act.15 Section 101 of NEPA established a “continuing 
policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and 
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
                                                                                                                      
 
development. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, BLM/OC/ST-
11/001+1165, Public Land Statistics tbl.1-4 (2010), available at http://www.blm.gov/ 
public_land_statistics/pls10/pls1-4_10.pdf. 
12 This Article will not address the administrative law issues of standing, ripeness, and 
other related issues that are relevant and important to discussions of NEPA but have been 
extensively covered in the legal literature. See, e.g., Tom J. Boer, Does Confusion Reign at the 
Intersection of Environmental and Administrative Law?: Review of Interpretive Rules and Policy 
Statements Under Judicial Review Provisions Such as RCRA Section 7006(a)(1), 26 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. L. Rev. 519 (1999); Matthew Porterfield, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Repre-
sentative: The (Con)fusion of APA Standing and the Merits Under NEPA, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 157 (1995). In recent years, federal courts have decided a number of standing cases. 
See generally Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Sierra, No. 2:07-cv-00199-CW, 2010 WL 
4782976 (D. Utah Nov. 16, 2010); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 
(D.D.C. 1992). The court in Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Sierra held that conservation groups 
did not have standing to challenge thirty-nine oil and gas leases because they did not show 
their members would be injured. 2010 WL 4782976, at *1. Wilderness Society v. Kane does 
not involve energy, but in the case the court rejected environmentalists’ attempt to gain 
standing through the Supremacy Clause. 632 F.3d at 1165. In Foundation on Economic Trends 
v. Watkins, the court held that the nonprofit organization did not have standing to use 
NEPA to challenge the Secretaries of Energy, Agriculture, and the Interior for alleged 
failures to consider the effects on global warming of federal actions under their authority. 
794 F. Supp. at 396. 
13 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370 (2006)). 
14 Id. 
15 Linda Luther, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33152, The National Environmental 
Policy Act: Background and Implementation 6 (2008), available at http://www.fta.dot. 
gov/documents/Unit1_01CRSReport.pdf. “In the more than 30 years since passage of 
NEPA, Congress has amended the law only to include minor technical changes.” Id. 
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nature can exist in productive harmony.”16 Section 101(b) set out more 
specific responsibilities including the need for the federal government 
to act “as trustee of the environment” for future generations and to 
“achieve a balance between population and resource use.”17 To prevent 
citizens from using the statute as a basis for claiming a right to an un-
sullied environment, section 101(c) added a provision “that each per-
son should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a 
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of 
the environment.”18 Thus, NEPA’s section 101 did not appear to im-
pose any significant new obligation on the federal government or pro-
vide new legal rights to citizens.19 
 The reason that NEPA became an important environmental law 
was the action-forcing provision of section 102(2)(C), which required 
that “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment” include “a detailed statement by the responsible 
official.” NEPA requires that this statement include: 
 (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
 (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, 
 (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
 (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
 (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.20 
The detailed statement is now called an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS). Section 102(2)(E) buttressed the EIS process by stating that 
agencies shall “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to 
                                                                                                                      
 
16 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(a), 83 Stat. at 
852. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. § 101(c), 83 Stat. at 853. 
19 See id. § 101, 83 Stat. at 852–54. 
20 Id. § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat. at 853. 
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recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unre-
solved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.”21 
 To carry out the responsibilities created by NEPA, section 202 es-
tablished a three-member Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 
the Executive Office of the President. Its duties and functions are set 
forth in sections 204 and 205 in one page.22 
 NEPA is a poorly drafted statute, which may be the result of com-
promises made to ensure its enactment. NEPA originated in the U.S. 
Senate’s 1969 bill, S. 1075, introduced by Senator Henry Jackson (D-
Wa.).23 S. 1075 did not contain any provision for judicial review, en-
forcement, or sanctions for failure of a federal agency to comply. The 
important “action-forcing” provision requiring an EIS was added after a 
single day of legislative hearings on the bill.24 Thus, this provision has 
virtually no legislative history. NEPA, as enacted, represents a synthesis 
of the U.S. House of Representatives’ H.R. 6750 and the Senate’s S. 
1075, but the important sections—101 through 105—are based on S. 
1075.25 NEPA’s section 209 authorized funding “not to exceed $300,000 
for fiscal year 1970, $700,000 for fiscal year 1971, and $1,000,000 for 
each fiscal year thereafter.”26 This level of funding signaled that not 
much would be accomplished under the Act. NEPA also failed to pro-
vide for staff to carry out its function. This led Congress to include Title 
II in the 1970 Federal Water Pollution Control amendment, which in-
cluded financial provisions to staff the CEQ and implement NEPA.27 
NEPA costs are often integrated into an agency’s responsibilities related 
to its mission, so determining costs associated solely with NEPA compli-
ance is difficult. Agencies implementing NEPA, however, are permitted 
to utilize external resources, including personnel; many agencies can 
                                                                                                                      
 
21 Id. § 102(2)(E), 83 Stat. at 853. 
22 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–190, §§ 204–205, 83 Stat. 
at 855. 
23 S. 1075, 91st Cong. (1969) (enacted). 
24 Lynton Keith Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: An Agenda 
for the Future 29 (1998); see National Environmental Policy Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 
1752 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 116 (1969) (statement of 
Lynton K. Caldwell, Professor of Government, University of Indiana). 
25 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 101–105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4335 
(2006); S. 1075; H.R. 6750, 91st Cong. (1969) (enacted). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 4347. 
27 Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, §§ 202(c)(2), 
205, 84 Stat. 91, 114–15. 
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pass costs on to others, such as applicants seeking a federal permit or 
other federal benefits.28 
 NEPA might have been consigned to the backwater of environ-
mental law but for the aggressive interpretation of its provisions in cases 
argued by the fledging environmental law bar in the 1970s before fed-
eral courts. Very quickly, case law established the elements needed to 
make NEPA a useful tool. The courts recognized that conservation 
groups had standing to bring suits based on “federal question” jurisdic-
tion29 and section 702 of the APA.30 One of the most important cases 
that shaped NEPA jurisprudence was Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Commit-
tee, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.31 Judge J. Skelly Wright criti-
cized the Agency’s “crabbed interpretation of NEPA [that] makes a 
mockery of the Act.”32 He added, “NEPA was meant to do more than 
regulate the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy.”33 NEPA re-
quires compliance “to the fullest extent possible.”34 Today it is accepted 
that agency actions under NEPA can be appealed to a federal district 
court based on the APA’s requirement that agency action must not be 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law.”35 The courts have interpreted the APA to require an 
agency to find and record facts that provide a rational basis for its deci-
sion, which has become known as the “hard look” doctrine.36 
 Although NEPA provides no sanctions for a failure to comply, 
judges have used their equity power to enjoin a project from moving 
forward until NEPA’s requirements are satisfied. The first major case 
under NEPA involved a Department of the Interior (Interior) permit 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 See 40 C.F.R. § 1507.2 (2011). 
29 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 (1978); see 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
30 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986); see 5 
U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
31 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Be-
tween the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 25 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 6 (2006). 
32 449 F.2d at 1117. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1118 (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332 (2006)). 
35 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 608 
F.3d 592, 607 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding agency action to be arbitrary and capricious under 
APA). 
36 See, e.g., Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell, 599 F.3d 926, 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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needed for a road to cross federal land to build the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line. On April 23, 1970, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia enjoined the issuance of the permit until Interior complied 
with NEPA’s section 102(2)(C).37 To obtain an injunction a party must 
demonstrate that it has suffered an irreparable injury, the absence of 
an adequate legal remedy, that the balance of the relative hardships 
between the parties favors the issuance of an injunction, and that the 
remedy is the public interest.38 Injunctive relief is not automatic, how-
ever, and sometimes a partial injunction is appropriate.39 “The district 
court has broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary 
to remedy an established wrong.”40 
 The rapid development of case law concerning compliance with 
the EIS process led the CEQ to issue guidelines summarizing the law on 
NEPA section 102 on April 23, 1971.41 These guidelines evolved into 
regulations in 1978.42 The regulations require agencies to provide high 
quality environmental information to citizens and public officials be-
fore a decision can be made.43 
 NEPA requires an EIS to be prepared whenever a proposal involves 
a major federal action that will significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment.44 Regulations promulgated to implement NEPA 
have modified this requirement. The regulations provide for the use of 
draft, final, and supplemental EISs (DEISs, FEISs, SEISs, respectively) 
and the use of “tiering” to avoid repetitive coverage of material.45 The 
DEIS has a recommended format.46 It must include consultation with 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 887, 893 (D.D.C. 1973). 
38 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Money damages are 
usually considered an inadequate remedy in environmental cases. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). 
39 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). 
40 Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994); see N. Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Norton, 503 F. 3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2007). 
41 Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 36 Fed. Reg. 
7724, 7724 (Apr. 23, 1971). 
42 National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,990, 55,978–
56,007 (Nov. 28, 1978). 
43 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2011). 
44 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18, .27 (defining “Major Federal action” and “Significantly,” re-
spectively). 
45 See infra notes 300–590 and accompanying text. 
46 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.10–.13. 
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agencies preparing studies mandated by specified environmental laws47 
and the comments of federal agencies that have “jurisdiction by law or 
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.”48 
 To determine whether an EIS is required, federal agencies may 
prepare an environmental assessment (EA).49 The EA “[s]hall include 
brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives as re-
quired by section 102(2)(E), of the environmental impacts of the pro-
posed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons 
consulted.”50 The EA must foster informed decision making and public 
participation.51 Then, if, based on the EA, the agency finds the pro-
posed action will produce no significant impact on the environment, it 
can choose not to prepare an EIS by issuing a finding of no significant 
impact (FONSI).52 The D.C. Circuit articulated a four-part test to scru-
tinize an agency’s FONSI.53 The court will determine: (1) whether the 
agency took a “hard look” at the proposal; (2) whether “the relevant 
areas of environmental concern” were addressed; (3) whether the 
agency made a convincing determination that the environmental im-
pact was insignificant; and (4) if the impact is significant, whether the 
changes in the proposed project will sufficiently reduce the adverse en-
vironmental impact.54 An agency must comply with NEPA’s documenta-
tion requirements before it makes “any irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment of resources.”55 At the time of decision, the agency must 
prepare a concise Record of Decision (ROD) that identifies the alter-
natives considered and the relevant factors used by the agency in mak-
ing its decision, and the mitigation, monitoring, and enforcement 
measures selected to avoid environmental harm.56 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 Id. § 1502.25. 
48 Id. § 1503.1(a)(1). 
49 Id. § 1501.4(b)–(c). 
50 Id. § 1508.9(b). 
51 See Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 958 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2005) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)). 
52 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e). 
53 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
54 Id. 
55 Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conner v. Burford, 
848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
56 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2. 
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 NEPA requires a process for determining the scope of the EIS in 
order to identify the significant issues to be addressed.57 NEPA requires 
discussion of both the direct and indirect environmental conse-
quences.58 In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, the Supreme 
Court explained that there must be “‘a reasonably close causal relation-
ship’ between the environmental effect and the alleged cause.”59 The 
causal relationship requirement is analogous to the tort law doctrine of 
proximate cause.60 Satisfying the “but for” test, also used in tort law, is 
insufficient to establish a causal relationship under NEPA.61 Agencies 
must circulate DEISs and FEISs to federal agencies with special expertise 
or jurisdiction, to appropriate state or local agencies, and to other per-
sons or organizations requesting the documents.62 The agency prepar-
ing the EIS must request comments and respond to any received.63 
When issuing its decision, the agency must develop a ROD that includes 
a discussion of alternatives and the factors leading to the agency’s selec-
tion of a course of action, as well as the steps taken to minimize envi-
ronmental harm and the mitigation measures that are to be applied.64 
 NEPA regulations require agencies to “review their policies, pro-
cedures, and regulations accordingly and revise them as necessary to 
assure full compliance with the purposes and provisions of the Act.”65 
The regulations require agencies to adopt implementing procedures 
that include identifying actions that normally require an EA or EIS and 
those that do not.66 The Department of Energy (DOE), for example, 
promulgated its NEPA compliance regulations on April 24, 1992.67 
 The NEPA regulations of 1978 were promulgated at a time when 
the Supreme Court was working to undo expansive pro-environment 
                                                                                                                      
 
57 Id. § 1501.7. 
58 Id. §§ 1502.16(a)–(b), 1508.8. 
59 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear En-
ergy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19. 
63 Id. §§ 1503.1–.4. 
64 Id. §§ 1505.2–.3. 
65 Id. § 1500.6. 
66 Id. § 1507.3(b)(2)(i)–(iii). 
67 National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg. 15,122 
(Apr. 24, 1992) (codified as amended at 10 C.F.R. pt. 1021). 
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decisions of the lower courts.68 The Court made several important dis-
tinctions that limited the scope of environmental review and allowed 
agencies great discretion as long as they complied with the procedural 
requirements of NEPA. 
 In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the Court held that NEPA’s requirements are “essentially 
procedural,” ending efforts by environmentalists to establish substantive 
rights under NEPA.69 In Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen 
the Court upheld the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment’s decision to reject an alternative that was environmentally prefer-
able, emphasizing that any change would cause delay.70 The Court reit-
erated that once an agency meets its procedural requirements under 
NEPA, “the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has consid-
ered the environmental consequences” of its actions.71 
 An agency’s action or inaction under NEPA can be challenged in a 
federal district court. A Ninth Circuit decision dramatically increased 
the number of potential defendants, allowing non-federal defendants 
to intervene in NEPA cases.72 The scope of review is based on the APA’s 
standard that agency action may not be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”73 The court 
limits its review of an agency’s decision to whether a satisfactory expla-
nation of the agency’s action was articulated and there is “a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”74 An agency 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors Congress did 
not intend to be part of the review, if it failed to consider important 
aspects of the proposal, or if the agency’s explanation for its actions 
either runs counter to the evidence or is implausible.75 NEPA’s primary 
requirement is that the agency preparing an EA or EIS takes a hard 
                                                                                                                      
 
68 National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,990, 55,978–
56,007 (Nov. 28, 1978); see Sam Kalen, The APA’s Influence on the Development of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Spring 2009, at 3, 3–4. 
69 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see Kalen, supra note 68, at 7. 
70 444 U.S. 223, 226 (1980). 
71 Id. at 227–28 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558). 
72 Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d at 1176. 
73 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2006). 
74 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see, e.g., 
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001). 
75 Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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look at the environmental impacts of a proposal.76 Courts use this hard 
look test to ensure an “agency has adequately considered and disclosed 
the environmental impact of its [proposed] actions.”77 
 In Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, for example, environ-
mental organizations challenged the Bureau of Land Managment’s 
(BLM’s) revisions to nationwide grazing regulations based on NEPA, 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act.78 The BLM’s regulatory changes would have reduced 
public participation in the grazing management policies, given federal 
water rights to grazing lessees—with adverse consequences for wild-
life—and made it significantly more difficult for the BLM to deal with 
grazing violations.79 To accomplish this, the BLM ignored the concerns 
of state agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and its own experts.80 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that “BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the 
environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory amend-
ments.”81 The court also noted that because the BLM was changing its 
regulations, a reasoned explanation “including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made” was required.82 Such an 
explanation was not provided, and thus the BLM’s decision that its ac-
tion would have no significant environmental impact was arbitrary and 
capricious.83 
 The overarching goal of NEPA is to require federal agencies to 
consider environmental issues before acting.84 “The NEPA process is 
intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on un-
derstanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that pro-
tect, restore, and enhance the environment.”85 As will be discussed in 
more detail, NEPA is now being interpreted to require the considera-
                                                                                                                      
 
76 Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 900 F.2d 269, 282 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). 
77 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98 (1983). 
78 632 F.3d 472, 476–77 (9th Cir. 2011). 
79 Id. at 479–81. 
80 Id. at 492. 
81 Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82 Id. at 494. 
83 Id. at 495. 
84 Trent Baker, Judicial Enforcement of Forest Plans in the Wake of Ohio Forestry, 21 Pub. 
Land & Resources L. Rev. 81, 88 (2000); see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
85 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2010). 
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tion of global climate change as it relates to decisions within an agen-
cy’s jurisdiction.86 If a federal agency does not comply with NEPA, a 
legal challenge can be used to slow the progress of proposed projects.87 
Because NEPA is primarily limited to achieving procedural compliance, 
eventually a federal agency will produce a document that meets the 
statute’s requirements.88 However, delay can result in the applicable law 
being changed or a project being abandoned by an applicant.89 In ad-
dition, many cases involving challenges to development also involve 
claims based on other federal environmental and land management 
statutes, particularly the ESA,90 and NEPA-based claims may help but-
tress such challenges to government actions.91 
 The EPA must “comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA 
for its research and development activities, facilities construction, 
wastewater treatment construction grants under Title II of the Clean 
Water Act (CWA), EPA-issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System permits for new sources, and for certain projects funded 
through EPA annual Appropriations Acts.”92 Other EPA actions under 
the CWA are exempt from the requirements of NEPA.93 Actions under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) are exempt from the requirements of NEPA.94 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act also exempts the EPA from the procedural requirements of 
environmental laws for its response actions.95 Courts have held “that 
EPA procedures or environmental reviews under enabling legislation 
are functionally equivalent to the NEPA process” and consequently ex-
empt from NEPA’s procedural requirements.96 
                                                                                                                      
 
86 See infra notes 817–879 and accompanying text. 
87 Daniel Ackman, Highway to Nowhere: NEPA, Environmental Review and the Westway 
Case, 21 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 325, 329 (1988); Sarah Axtell, Reframing the Judicial 
Approach to Injunctive Relief for Environmental Plaintiffs in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 38 Ecology L.Q. 317, 337 (2011). 
88 See Axtell, supra note 87, at 336. 
89 See Ackman, supra note 87, at 332, 340–41. 
90 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158, 172 (1978); see 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
91 See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2007). 
92 Notice of Policy and Procedures for Voluntary Preparation of Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act 
Documents, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045 (Oct. 29, 1998) [hereinafter Notice of Policy and Proce-
dures]. 
93 See Clean Water Act § 511, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (2006). 
94 See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 § 7, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 793(c)(1) (2006). 
95 Notice of Policy and Procedures, supra note 92, at 58,046. 
96 Id. 
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 The EPA has had a policy of voluntarily preparing EAs since 
1974,97 which became formalized on October 29, 1998.98 The policy 
explains that the “EPA will prepare an EA or, if appropriate, an EIS on a 
case-by-case basis . . . where the Agency determines that such an analysis 
would be beneficial.”99 The policy lists the criteria for making such a 
determination and identifies various statutes implicating NEPA, with 
the CAA as the most applicable to energy development.100 
 Based on section 309 of the CAA, the EPA also has an oversight 
responsibility to review and comment on the environmental impact of 
legislation, federal construction projects, major federal actions, and 
proposed regulations published by any federal agency.101 This provides 
the EPA with leverage to influence federal agency actions. If the Ad-
ministrator determines any legislation, action, or regulation adversely 
impacts public health, welfare, or environmental quality, they can pub-
lish this determination and refer the matter to the CEQ.102 
 In addition to complying with NEPA, executive orders require fed-
eral agencies to meet more challenging environmental protection 
goals. Executive Order 13,175 of November 6, 2000, requires an as-
sessment of an action’s impact on tribal trust resources.103 Executive 
Order 13,211 of May 18, 2001, requires a report for energy related ac-
tions that may have an adverse effect on distribution, use, or supply.104 
Executive Order 13,212 of May 18, 2001, requires agencies to expedite 
energy-related projects by streamlining internal processes “while main-
taining safety, public health, and environmental protections.”105 Execu-
tive Order 13,423 of January 24, 2007, imposes requirements that go 
beyond the goals of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.106 It calls for federal 
agencies to reduce their energy intensity and to increase the use of re-
                                                                                                                      
 
97 Environmental Impact Statements: Statement of Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 16,186 (May 7, 
1974), modified at 39 Fed. Reg. 37,419 (Oct. 21, 1974) (replaced by Notice of Policy and 
Procedures, supra note 92). 
98 Notice of Policy and Procedures, supra note 92, at 58,045–47. 
99 Id. at 58,046. 
100 Id. at 58,047. 
101 Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2006). 
102 Id. § 7609(b). 
103 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. § 304 (2001). 
104 Exec. Order No. 13,211, 3 C.F.R. § 767 (2002). 
105 Exec. Order No. 13,212, 3 C.F.R. § 769 (2002). 
106 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 15,811(c); Exec. Order No. 13,423, 
C.F.R. 193 (2008). 
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newable energy.107 Issued on October 5, 2009, Executive Order 13,514 
expanded the energy reduction and environmental performance re-
quirements of Executive Order 13,423 by directing each federal agency 
to develop a strategic plan to further reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.108 The CEQ released guidance for implementing Executive 
Order 13,514 on March 4, 2011.109 The instructions call on each 
agency to issue climate change adaptation plans that address the chal-
lenges posed by climate change to the agency’s mission, programs, and 
operations.110 The Strategic Plan for each agency was to be submitted 




                                                             
A. Major Federal Action 
 NEPA requires that the federal government prepare a detailed 
statement of the environmental impact of proposed “major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”112 
Section 102 requires that agencies comply “to the fullest extent possi-
ble.”113 “To the fullest extent possible” means that federal agencies 
must act in accordance with the statute unless other statutory require-
ments demand otherwise.114 The term “major” reinforces 
“s ificantly” but does not have an independent meaning.115 
 If there is a substantial question whether an action may have a 
“significant effect” on the environment, then the agency must prepare 
                                                         
 
r No. 13,423, 3 C.F.R. § 193. 
Federal Agency Climate Change Adaptation 
Pla
Id. at 3; Federal Agency Strategic Sustainability Performance Plans, Council on Envtl. Qual-
ity, visited Apr. 26, 
2012
deral Agency Strategic Sustainability Performance Plans, supra note 110. 
nvironmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(200
1500.6 (2011); see id. § 1507.3(b) (requiring agencies to comply with the 




108 Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. § 248 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,423, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 193. 
109 Council on Envtl. Quality, 








113 Id. § 4332. 
114 40 C.F.R. § 
lations therein e
ements). 
115 Id. § 
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an EIS.116 Whether a proposed action will have a significant effect on 
the environment requires consideration of context and intensity.117 
Context refers to the scope of the proposed action, including the inter-
ests affected.118 Intensity includes the cumulative effects, future effects, 
and the potential impact on endangered or threatened species or their 
habitat.119 Intensity concerns factors such as: (1) beneficial and adverse 
impacts; (2) effects on public health or safety; (3) unique characteris-
tics of the geographic area including proximity to wetlands, cultural or 
historic resources, park lands, or ecologically critical areas; (4) the de-
gree to which the effects are likely to be highly controversial;120 (5) the 
degree to which the environmental effects are uncertain or involve un-
known or unique risks; (6) the degree to which the action may set a 
precedent; (7) whether the action is related to others that have indi-
vidually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts;121 (8) the 
degree to which the action may adversely affect places listed in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places or may cause the loss or destruction of 
significant historical, cultural, or scientific resources; (9) the degree to 
which the action may have an adverse effect on a threatened or endan-
gered species or its habitat; and (10) whether the action risks violating 
federal, state, or local law or requirements that protect the environ-
enm t.122 
 From the inception of NEPA litigation, courts have rejected NEPA 
applicability to truly minor federal actions. For example, in 1972, a fed-
eral judge held that a cold-weather training exercise by nine hundred 
marines bivouacking in Maine’s Reid State Park was not a major federal 
action.123 Parties continue to bring claims that minor actions are in fact 
major actions. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway 
                                                                                                                      
 
116 See, e.g., Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
117 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. 
118 Id. § 1508.27(a). 
119 See id. § 1508.27(b). 
120 Id. § 1508.27(b)(4). Controversy is “where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, 
nature, or effect of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a 
use.” Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973). 
121 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). The cumulative impact is that which results from the ag-
gregation of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of 
which agency undertakes the actions. Id. § 1508.7. Even minor actions can aggregate cu-
mulative impacts over time. Id. 
122 Id. § 1508.27(b). 
123 Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972). 
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Traffic Safety Administration, the court held that the plaintiff had stand-
ing to bring a NEPA case, but a one mile per gallon change in the Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy standard was not significant enough to 
igg
M and the Forest Service conducted an inadequate EA, im-
rop
fs’ claims under the Mineral Leasing 
ct 
                                                                                                                     
tr er the need for an EIS.124 The threshold for determining what is a 
major federal action is low.125 
 An energy case interpreting what constitutes “significant” is Anglers 
of the Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Service.126 The case involved an action by one 
private citizen and two environmental groups who alleged that the 
BLM and the Forest Service violated three federal acts by approving gas 
and oil drilling within the Huron-Manistee National Forest. The plain-
tiffs asked for review of the agencies’ decisions, as well as declaratory 
and injunctive relief. They also alleged violations of NEPA, the National 
Forest Management Act, the Mineral Leasing Act, and the APA, claim-
ing the BL
p erly issued a FONSI, and failed to prepare an EIS regarding the 
project.127 
 The district court held that the defendants failed to comply with 
the procedural requirements of NEPA in determining that the project 
would have no significant impact, but the Forest Service did not violate 
either the National Forest Management Act or the Mineral Leasing 
Act.128 The court agreed with a magistrate’s report, finding that: (1) the 
defendants failed to comply with NEPA’s procedural requirements; (2) 
the EA was faulty; and thus (3) the FONSI was incorrect.129 The magis-
trate did not address the plaintif
A or National Forest Management Act—which resulted in summary 
judgment for the defendants.130 
 The court concluded “[t]he Forest Service acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in finding that the leaseholder’s . . . proposed drilling pro-
ject would have no significant environmental impact.”131 The court 
found that the defendants did not adequately address four of the 
CEQ’s intensity factors in issuing the FONSI.132 “[T]he Forest Service 
 
 
124 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
125 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
126 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815–16 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
127 Id. at 815. 
128 Id. at 840. 
129 Id. at 815. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Anglers, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 816. 
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failed to study the possible impact of the project on the unique recrea-
tional characteristics” of the impacted area including the impact “on 
tourism at the local, county, and state levels.”133 Moreover, the effects of 
the project were highly uncertain, and the Agency failed to explain the 
lack of better data.134 The court also found the biological assessment to 
 “
for the drilling site.139 
he
EIS.141 The most common technique agencies use for 
oi
                                                                                                                     
be woefully inadequate” in assessing the impact of the project on the 
endangered Kirtland’s warbler.135 
 In addition, “the Forest Service did not consider an appropriate 
range of alternatives to [the] proposed drilling project as required by 
NEPA and CEQ regulations.”136 According to NEPA, an agency must 
consider a project’s appropriate alternatives that might affect the cost-
benefit balance.137 Moreover, an agency may not use its own objectives 
to prevent the consideration of meaningful alternatives.138 The Forest 
Service did not take the required hard look at the “No Action” alterna-
tive and did not consider alternative locations 
T  Court declared the EA and the FONSI inadequate, and enjoined 
the defendants from authorizing the project.140 
 To achieve consistency in the determination of what constitutes a 
major federal action, CEQ regulations call for federal agencies to iden-
tify three classes of actions: (1) those that normally require an EIS; (2) 
those that normally do not require either an EIS or an EA (categorical 
exclusions); and (3) those that normally require EAs but do not neces-
sarily require an 









138 Anglers, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 816 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 817. 
141 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b) (2011). Categorical exclusions are defined at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.4. 
142 See Letter from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Barbara Boxer, 
Env’t and Public Works Comm. Chair, U.S. Senate, and James Inhofe, Env’t and Public Works 
Comm. Ranking Member, U.S. Senate (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ 
nepa/attachments/nov2011/CEQ_EPW_11th_ARRA_NEPA_Report_Nov_02_2011.pdf (re-
porting that agencies completed 184,730 of 192,700 NEPA reviews of Recovery Act Division A 
projects as categorical exclusions). 
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 Categorical exclusions are defined as actions that do not individu-
ally or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environ-
ment using the procedures set out in CEQ regulations.143 The applica-
tion of a categorical exclusion is not allowed if there are “extraordinary 
circumstances” that indicate a specific activity may have a significant 
environmental effect.144 The DOE’s supplemental regulations provide 
guidelines for when an agency may use categorical exclusions—only if 
“[t]here are no extraordinary circumstances related to the proposal 
that may affect the significance of the environmental effects of the 
proposal.”145 The regulations further describe extraordinary circum-
stances as “unique situations presented by specific proposals, such as 
scientific controversy about the environmental effects of the proposal; 
uncertain effects or effects involving unique or unknown risks; or unre-
lve
                                                                                                                     
so d conflicts concerning alternate uses of available resources within 
the meaning of section 102(2)(E) of NEPA.”146 
 On November 23, 2010, the CEQ issued its final guidance on how 
federal agencies should establish, apply, and revise categorical exclu-
sions.147 The guidance includes the admonition that agencies must 
consider whether extraordinary circumstances exist when evaluating 
whether a categorical exclusion applies.148 An example of extraordi-
nary circumstances in energy development projects is the potential for 
impacting protected species habitat under the ESA.149 In California v. 
Norton, for example, Interior failed to prepare an EA or an EIS before 
granting oil and gas lease suspensions based on its claimed categorical 
exclusion.150 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that 
the claimed categorical exclusion was not adequately documented.151 
The record showed the lease suspensions could affect the threatened 





idance does not apply to “categorical exclusions estab-
lishe 5,631 n.6. 
,629. 
1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). 




147 Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Establishing, Applying, 
and Revising Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 75,628 (Dec. 6, 2010). The gu
d by statute.” Id. at 7
148 Id. at 75
149 See id. 
150 See 311 F.3d 
151 Id. at 1165. 
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the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary.152 The court held that 
if any of the exceptions to the categorical exclusion apply, a categorical 
exclusion may not be utilized to avoid NEPA-based requirements.153 
Moreover, prior to making a decision, the agency must consider the 
environmental consequences of its actions and make a factual determi-
nation that a categorical exclusion applies.154 CEQ guidance identifies 
e 
 silence by issuing 2000 drilling permits in fiscal year 2006 
and part of fiscal year 2007 without a review for extraordinary circum-
stances.159 
agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the pro-
                                                                                                                     
th documentation that may be needed to utilize a categorical exclu-
sion.155 
 DOE lists its categorical exclusions within its regulations,156 how-
ever, categorical exclusions may also be established by statute.157 For 
example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included five categorical exclu-
sions for oil and gas development, but the Act is silent concerning 
whether the limitation on the use of categorical exclusions is applicable 
when there are extraordinary circumstances.158 The BLM took advan-
tage of this
B. Considering Alternatives 
 CEQ’s NEPA policy is “to emphasize real environmental issues and 
alternatives” and to use the NEPA process to “assess the reasonable al-
ternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize adverse ef-
fects” on the human environment.160 CEQ regulations require that an 
EIS “shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which the 
 
 
icy Act: Revised Implementing Pro-
ced
Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert v. Collinge, 148 F. Supp. 2d 
109
lusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 75 Fed. 
Reg
6 10 C.F.R. pt. 1021, at apps. A–B (2011); see infra notes 880–959 and accompanying 
text
 Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15,942 (2006). 
s: Are Agencies Silencing the Public’s Voice?, Nat. 
Res 3. 
0.2(b), (e) (2010). 
152 Id. at 1176. 
153 Id. at 1177 (citing National Environmental Pol
ures, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,437, 21,439 (May 21, 1984)). 
154 See id. at 1176 (citing 
7, 1103 (D. Idaho 2001). 
155 Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Establishing, Applying, 
and Revising Categorical Exc
. 75,628 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
15
. 
157 See, e.g., The Energy
158 See id. § 15,942(b). 
159 Stephanie Young, Categorical Exclusion
ources & Env’t, Spring 2009, at 39, 4
160 40 C.F.R. § 150
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posed action.”161 Externally generated proposals may be used for back-
ground information, but the agency is responsible for an independent 
ate
agencies, organizations, communities, and members of the pub-
16
any “no action” alternative.174 Fifth, an agency must identify its pre-
                                                                                                                     
st ment of purpose and need.162 
 Agencies are to develop appropriate alternatives for “any proposal 
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of avail-
able resources.”163 This requirement is extended by NEPA to include all 
proposals, not just those included in an EIS review.164 The EIS shall 
state whether considered alternatives meet the requirements of NEPA 
and other environmental laws and policies.165 The alternatives analyzed 
by an EIS shall include those considered by the “ultimate agency deci-
sionmaker.”166 Prior to making a decision, an agency shall not invest 
resources that might prejudice the selection of alternatives.167 The al-
ternatives analysis is considered “the heart of the [EIS]” and is to be 
presented in comparative form so as to provide “a clear basis for choice 
among options by the decisionmaker and the public.”168 An agency 
must analyze significant alternatives that are called to its attention by 
other 
lic. 9 
 When performing an alternatives analysis, an agency must follow 
six requirements.170 First, an agency must thoroughly consider and 
evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and must explain the basis for ex-
cluding any alternative from future detailed study.171 Second, an agency 
must consider each alternative in detail so that reviewers may objec-
tively evaluate the merits of each option.172 Third, an agency must in-
clude alternatives outside its own jurisdiction.173 Fourth, it must include 
 
 
161 Id. § 1502.13. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. § 1501.2(c). 
164 Id. § 1507.2(d). 
165 Id. § 1502.2(d). 
166 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(e); see id. § 1505.1(e). 
167 Id. § 1502.2(f); see id. § 1506.1(a). 
168 Id. § 1502.14. 
169 Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.2d 1221, 1230 
(1st Cir. 1979). 
170 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. 
171 Id. § 1502.14(a). 
172 Id. § 1502.14(b). 
173 Id. § 1502.14(c). 
174 Id. § 1502.14(d). 
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ferred alternative in both the draft statement and the final state-
ment.175 Finally, an agency’s alternatives analysis must include any miti-
gation measures not already considered in the proposed action or al-
ternatives.176 
                                                                                                                     
 The range of impacts considered in an EIS may be direct, indirect, 
or cumulative.177 One alternative that receives inadequate attention in 
the NEPA process is the use of consumption reducing techniques.178 
Many scholars have addressed the increase in GHG emissions due to 
increases in per capita use of energy,179 but the growth in energy use 
does not appear to be an important concern to those charged with ana-
lyzing alternatives when complying with NEPA.180 
 The seminal natural resource case dealing with alternatives, de-
cided by the D.C. Circuit, is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Mor-
ton.181 That case involved an oil and gas lease sale located off the coast 
of Louisiana.182 The court required Interior to consider the elimination 
or reduction of the oil import quota as a viable alternative in the EIS, 
 
 
175 Id. § 1502.14(e). Should another law prohibit the expression of such a preference, 
an agency need not meet this requirement. Id. 
176 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f). 
177 Id. § 1508.25(c). 
178 See Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and 
Consumption, 38 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,825, at 10,826 (2008) (describing the 
Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. not to require federal agencies to consider reduction of electricity consumption as an 
alternative to an EIS); see also Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 
Fordham. Urb. L.J. 253, 254 (2009) (arguing that reducing energy consumption will be 
an essential element to sufficiently reduce GHG emissions); James Salzman, Sustainable 
Consumption and the Law, 27 Envtl. L. 1243, 1260 (1997) (acknowledging the paradox of 
governmental action encouraging reducing consumption when economic growth pre-
sumptively requires consumption); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The 
Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 515, 535–
36 (2004) (emphasizing the significance of overlooking reduction of consumption as a 
regulatory instrument). 
179 See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 178; Salzman, supra note 178, at 1245; Vandenbergh, 
supra note 178, at 542; Kysar & Vandenbergh, supra note 178, at 10,828. 
180 See Matthew P. Reinhart, The National Environmental Policy Act: What Constitutes an 
Adequate Cumulative Environmental Impacts Analysis and Should It Require an Evaluation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 17 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 145, 177–87 (2010) (discussing how the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of GHG emissions under the CAA may provide a model for 
future NEPA decisions). 
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even though it was not within the authority of the agency.183 The court 
also held that agencies need not consider alternatives such as oil shale, 
tar sands, geothermal resources, or other alternative energy sources 
because at that time these energy sources were not well developed and 
could not be adequately analyzed.184 
 In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Dombeck, the Tenth Circuit 
ruled on NEPA claims involving U.S. Forest Service approval of a ski 
area expansion.185 The court addressed the claim that the impact on 
the lynx population was not adequately evaluated as part of an alterna-
tives analysis.186 The court noted that NEPA “does not require agencies 
to analyze the environmental consequences of alternatives it has in 
good faith rejected as too remote, speculative . . . impractical or ineffec-
tive.”187 NEPA does require, however, information “sufficient to permit 
a reasoned choice of alternatives as far as environmental aspects are 
concerned.”188 The court noted that some courts, including the Sev-
enth Circuit, have interpreted this requirement to prevent agencies 
from defining their objectives in unreasonably narrow terms so as to 
favor a desired alternative like the applicant’s proposed project.189 
 The Tenth Circuit went on to say that there are no hard and fast 
rules to guide the alternatives analysis: “Our task, then, is to determine 
whether the Forest Service stepped outside the established parameters 
by declining to give more attention to the Conservation Biology Alter-
native the Appellants prefer, or, stated differently, whether the alterna-
tives analysis provided satisfies the rule of reason.”190 The court held 
that the Forest Service was fully authorized “to limit its consideration to 
expansion alternatives designed to substantially meet the recreation 
development objectives of the Forest Plan.”191 As such, the court held 
the statements of purpose and need that the Forest Service drafted to 
guide the environmental review process for the proposed expansion 
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were not “unreasonably narrow.”192 The court stated that “the Forest 
Service provided a reasonable explanation for declining to further con-
sider the Conservation Biology Alternative in accordance with 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1502.14(a).”193 
 This case is particularly applicable to energy development cases 
because it provides insight into the application of NEPA to cases involv-
ing ideological differences. The plaintiffs wanted the Tenth Circuit to 
protect wilderness values194 while the Forest Service was carrying out 
multiple use management, which included providing expanded recrea-
tional opportunities.195 The Tenth Circuit appears to shape its NEPA 
review to accommodate the reality that development is not inconsistent 
with maintaining a pristine environment, and NEPA requirements 
should not inhibit development.196 
 Although NEPA imposes an obligation on an agency to consider 
alternatives, the courts have rejected intervenors’ efforts to vacate an 
agency’s EIS because the agency failed to consider an alternative that 
was not brought to its attention.197 If a court bases its rejection of an 
EIS on alternatives of concern to intervenors, the intervenors must 
identify those alternatives or forfeit judicial review.198 Because many 
proposed energy projects require water for development,199 an alterna-
tives analysis may need to consider reasonable uses of the water for 
purposes unrelated to the proposed energy project.200 For example, in 
a case involving the expansion of a ski resort on national forest lands, 
the First Circuit held that the Forest Service failed to examine reason-
able alternatives to the use of water for snowmaking.201 
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C. Mitigation 
 CEQ regulations require an agency to discuss possible mitigation 
measures in an EIS.202 On January 21, 2011, the CEQ released guid-
ance concerning how GHG mitigation and monitoring should be 
treated in the NEPA process, but it does not independently establish 
legally binding requirements.203 The guidance, however, is based on 
CEQ regulations and executive orders that impose legally binding re-
quirements.204 It is aimed at improving federal agencies’ procedures 
for dealing with mitigation.205 The guidance states that mitigation 
measures should be explicitly described, and include measurable per-
formance standards.206 The appendix includes an overview of a regula-
tion adopted by the Department of the Army, which the CEQ approves 
as a model that satisfies the mitigation and monitoring requirements.207 
Mitigation can be part of the integral components of a proposed pro-
ject’s design or can be alternatives that are considered in the EA or 
EIS.208 An EA can identify mitigation measures that reduce the poten-
tially significant environmental effects of proposed actions that would 
otherwise require preparation of an EIS.209 This could allow the agency 
to issue a FONSI or a “mitigated FONSI” if the agency makes a com-
mitment to ensure the mitigation supports the FONSI.210 
                                                                                                                     
 The guidance sets out five functions of mitigation. Mitigation in-
cludes: 
[(1)] Avoiding an impact by not taking a certain action or 
parts of an action; [(2)] Minimizing an impact by limiting the 
degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation; 
[(3)] Rectifying an impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or re-
 
 
202 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), .16(h), 1505.2(c), 1508.25(b)(3) (2011); see Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351–52 (1989). 
203 Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of 
Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of 
No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843, 3843–44 ( Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 1500–02, 1505–08). 
204 Id. at 3843; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1507.2–.3 (2011); Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 
4247 (Mar. 5, 1970), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). 
205 76 Fed. Reg. at 3843. 
206 Id. at 3848. 
207 Id. at 3851–52. 
208 Id. at 3847–48. 
209 Id. at 3848. 
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storing the affected environment; [(4)] Reducing or eliminat-
ing an impact over time, through preservation and mainte-
nance operations during the life of the action; and [(5)] 
Compensating for an impact by replacing or providing substi-
tute resources or environments.211 
 All mitigation should be explicitly described as on-going commit-
ments and subject to measurable performance standards with adequate 
implementation, monitoring, and reporting mechanisms included.212 If 
mitigation commitments are used as either a viable alternative or to 
avoid the need for an EIS, they should specify measurable performance 
standards and set clear performance expectations.213 “[T]he decision 
document following the EA should—and a [ROD] must—identify 
those mitigation measures that the agency is adopting and committing 
to implement, including any monitoring and enforcement program 
applicable to such mitigation commitments.”214 If mitigation commit-
ments are required to reduce environmental impacts below significant 
levels for a FONSI, they should be clearly identified as necessary, and 
detailed mitigation plans must be developed and implemented.215 
Once an agency has approved mitigation commitments, it should im-
plement internal procedures to make sure “relevant funding, permit-
ting, or other agency approvals and decisions are made conditional on 
performance of mitigation commitments.”216 
 If the agency does not undertake mitigation commitments or finds 
them to be ineffective, the agency should consider whether further 
NEPA remedies, including preparing an EIS, are needed.217 The 
agency should only undertake such remedies if it determines that some 
portion of the federal action remains to be completed and that there 
are opportunities to address the mitigation failure.218 Adaptive man-
agement or providing for alternative mitigation measures can help the 
agency react to mitigation failures.219 Monitoring is a key focus of the 
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guidance, and agencies are encouraged to monitor to ensure that miti-
gation commitments are carried out and provide the expected bene-
fits.220 Monitoring is required for EIS mitigation commitments as well 
as other mitigation deemed “important” by the agency, which would 
include mitigation necessary to support a FONSI.221 The federal agency 
is responsible for monitoring and ensuring that monitoring informa-
tion is available either online or in print.222 The public should be in-
volved in mitigation and monitoring when such involvement is deemed 
appropriate.223 This may not be the case in all situations, and needs 
such as privacy or confidentiality should be weighed against the bene-
fits of disclosing the information.224 
                                                                                                                     
 In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled the EIS’s description of proposed mitigation measures were 
inadequate in a case involving timber sales in an area of existing old-
growth habitat used by the pileated woodpecker and the redband 
trout.225 The Forest Service acknowledged the negative impact an in-
crease in sedimentation from the timber sale would have on the three 
creeks affected.226 It did not, however, identify which mitigation meas-
ures might reduce any such sedimentation increases or their potential 
effectiveness.227 Additionally, it was unclear whether the Forest Service 
would adopt any of the proposed mitigation measures.228 In fact, the 
Forest Service’s experts stated that the anticipated mitigation measures 
“are so general that it would be impossible to determine where, how, 
and when they would be used and how effective they would be.”229 Ul-
timately, the Forest Service’s sweeping statements and imprecise refer-
ences to mitigation measures did not provide sufficient detail about 
actual mitigation procedures that would occur.230 
 Reliance on mitigation measures to justify a FONSI or avoid the 





222 Id. at 3851. 
223 Id. at 3850. 
224 76 Fed. Reg. at 3851. 
225 137 F.3d 1372, 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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228 Id. 
229 Id. (quoting the Administrative Record). 
230 Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, 137 F.3d at 1381. 
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statute or regulation, or are submitted as part of the initial plan.231 In 
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Klein, environmental 
groups sued the Office of Surface Mining (OSM), a department within 
Interior, claiming that the OSM violated NEPA’s procedural require-
ments when it issued a permit renewal and permit revision allowing 
coal mining on a Navajo reservation.232 Among the alleged NEPA viola-
tions were claims that the OSM failed to discuss the mitigation of the 
impacts from mining.233 The court agreed and found the failure arbi-
trary and capricious in part because the mining operations would affect 
seventy-three significant historical and cultural sites, many of which 
were eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.234 
Therefore, the court ruled that the OSM must analyze the effects of the 
proposed permit revision on these resources before reaching a final 
decision.235 Though a mitigation plan need not be fully developed, it 
must include a reasonably complete discussion of the mitigation meas-
ures such that an assessment of the environmental costs of a proposed 
project can be appropriately considered before OSM reaches a final 
determination.236 A “mere listing of mitigation measures, without sup-
porting analytical data, is not sufficient to support a [FONSI].”237 The 
court found the lack of specificity in identifying mitigation measures 
that could be considered in issuing the FONSI barred any meaningful 
judicial review.238 In fact, the mitigation plans were to be created as a 
condition of OSM’s approval of the revised permit.239 Thus, OSM’s re-
liance on such potential mitigation measures was arbitrary and capri-
cious because, at the time, OSM did not have any detailed mitigation 
plans upon which to base its finding.240 
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D. Programmatic EIS, Tiering, and Cumulative Effects 
 “[EISs] may be prepared, and are sometimes required, for broad 
Federal actions such as adoption of new agency programs or regula-
tions.”241 “Agencies shall prepare statements on broad actions so that 
they are relevant to policy and are timed to coincide with meaningful 
points in agency planning and decisionmaking.”242 Such broad actions 
may be evaluated geographically, generically, or by the stage of techno-
logical development.243 Whenever a broad EIS has been prepared, a 
subsequent EIS or EA needs only to summarize issues discussed in the 
broader statement and incorporate them by reference in a process 
known as tiering.244 “In many ways, a programmatic EIS (PEIS) is supe-
rior to a limited, contract-specific EIS because it examines an entire 
policy initiative rather than performing a piecemeal analysis within the 
structure of a single agency action.”245 Tiering allows the NEPA process 
to proceed from policy development to site-specific statements without 
revisiting issues already addressed.246 If a project results in substantial 
changes or if significant new information becomes available that raises 
relevant environmental concerns, a supplemental document shall be 
prepared.247 
 CEQ regulations dealing with the scope of a NEPA-based analysis 
provide that actions that are “connected,” interdependent parts of a 
larger action, or are “cumulative” in impact should be discussed in the 
same EIS; actions that are “similar” may be analyzed in the same state-
ment.248 A cumulative impact occurs if an action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions can collectively 
have a significant impact on the environment.249 The impact can be 
caused by direct or indirect effects and may include induced changes in 
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land use, population density, or growth rate and effects on air, water, 
and ecosystems.250 
 In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court held that a coal PEIS was 
not required for the Northern Great Plains region because the national 
coal-leasing program did not involve an action of regional scope.251 The 
district court found that Interior had no proposed or existing plan for 
the regional development of the discussed area.252 Though three studies 
had been initiated by Interior in the region, the district court found that 
these studies were not part of any comprehensive plan or program to 
promote growth in the Northern Great Plains.253 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court found that individual coal development projects planned by 
private industry or public utilities in the Northern Great Plains area 
were not integrated into any such plan or program.254 
 Although the court of appeals reversed the district court, it did not 
find a regional development program for the Northern Great Plains.255 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the petitioners “con-
templated” such a regional plan.256 The court noted that the three 
studies initiated by Interior signified individual companies’ “attempts to 
control development” on a regional scale.257 It also concluded that the 
interim report from one of the studies, the Northern Great Plains Re-
sources Program (NGPRP), would provide the petitioners with needed 
information, allowing them to formulate the “contemplated” regional 
plan.258 
 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Court of Appeals 
erred in deciding that petitioners had contemplated a regional devel-
opment plan.259 The Court found that the record before it presented 
no sign that the NGPRP was aimed at a regional plan or program, and 
recent events proved that such a plan was not the purpose of the 
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study.260 All parties agreed that no proposal for a regional plan or de-
velopment program existed.261 
 Contemplation of action, without more, is not enough to mandate 
the drafting of an EIS.262 Although the Court of Appeals recognized 
this fact, it nonetheless believed the statute gave it the power to compel 
preparation of an impact statement before any formal recommenda-
tion or report was released.263 The Supreme Court, however, held that 
neither the express language nor legislative history of NEPA supported 
such a conclusion.264 Rather, the statute explicitly addresses the timing 
of when an impact statement is required.265 An agency must have a fi-
nal statement only at the time it actually makes a recommendation or 
report on a proposed federal action.266 The contemplation of a project 
and an accompanying study do not, without more, constitute a pro-
posal for significant federal action.267 
 Respondents, including the Sierra Club, argued that, “even with-
out a comprehensive federal plan for the development of the Northern 
Great Plains, a regional impact statement nevertheless is required on all 
coal-related projects in the region because they are intimately re-
lated.”268 Therefore, when an agency has multiple proposals pending 
before it for coal-related activities in a specific region, and the actions 
will have cumulative environmental consequences, the environmental 
costs of all activities must be jointly considered.269 In other words, an 
agency can only assess different courses of action if it first considers all 
pending proposals in full.270 Respondents argued for the necessity of a 
complete impact statement on the Northern Great Plains because the 
coal-related activity in that area was “‘programmatically,’ ‘geographi-
cally,’ and ‘environmentally’ related.”271 The programmatic and geo-
graphic components were similar—both supported the argument that 
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a comprehensive EIS was proper, especially considering that Interior 
had a regional approach for assessing environmental impact in the 
Northern Great Plains area.272 
 The Supreme Court refused to rule that petitioners’ decisions with 
respect to the EIS were arbitrary.273 The Court found that “[e]ven if en-
vironmental interrelationships could be shown conclusively to extend 
across basins and drainage areas, practical considerations of feasibility 
might well necessitate restricting the scope of comprehensive state-
ments.”274 Furthermore, the Court found that although relationships 
between the multiple proposed coal-related projects in the Northern 
Great Plains region may have existed, such connections on their own 
are not enough to require that the petitioners prepare a full impact 
statement for the region before approving individual pending applica-
tions.275 Because there was “no proposal for regionwide action that 
could require a regional impact statement,” the Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the district 
court.276 
 In League of Wilderness Defenders Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
Allen, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS complied with the require-
ments of NEPA concerning its assessment of cumulative impacts in a 
case involving commercial logging and thinning.277 The case involved 
alleged violations of NEPA and the National Forest Management Act.278 
The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the conservation groups, vacated the injunction, and remanded the 
case.279 The land at issue contains an old-growth forest that is habitat 
for the northern spotted owl, part of which was impacted by a forest 
fire.280 The Forest Service developed a plan to allow logging to reduce 
the risk of fire damage that would minimize harvesting in spotted owl 
habitat and allowed more intense logging in other areas.281 The Forest 
Service evaluated three alternatives: A) no action; B) the most intensive 
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treatment; and C) a less intensive treatment to reduce the average burn 
probability by forty percent over alternative A.282 The Forest Service 
adopted Alternative C, which was designed to protect the spotted 
owl.283 The Fish and Wildlife Service reviewed the plan and supported 
it.284 Nevertheless, the district court found that the analysis of cumula-
tive impacts in the EIS contained insufficient quantitative information 
about past projects.285 
 In 2005, the CEQ issued a memorandum counseling agencies that 
they “are not required to list or analyze the effects of individual past 
actions unless such information is necessary to describe the cumulative 
effect of all past actions combined.”286 After reviewing the EIS, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service’s discussion of cumulative 
impacts complied with its guidance and NEPA requirements because it 
sufficiently considered effects of past, present, and reasonably foresee-
able future actions.287 
 In a similar case, Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the cumulative impact analysis insuffi-
ciently discussed the impact of timber harvests in areas with old-growth 
habitat that house the pileated woodpecker.288 Thus, the court reversed 
and remanded the case to the Forest Service.289 Specifically, the discus-
sion of the cumulative effects of the four timber sales proposed for the 
Cuddy Mountain Roadless area was too general and did not meet the 
“hard look” test required by NEPA.290 
 The EIS’s discussion of past timber harvests and future planned 
conversions of old-growth forest did not provide the information need-
ed to assess the impact on the old-growth forest and pileated wood-
pecker.291 The Forest Service neglected to evaluate the share of old-
growth trees that would be eliminated by the three other potential tim-
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ber sales in the area, and whether the sales would disrupt the same pi-
leated woodpecker home ranges.292 In fact, the only mention of future 
sales in the EIS provided, “[f]uture timber sales over the next several 
years would propose to treat additional old-growth habitat.”293 A con-
sideration of cumulative effects requires detailed and quantified infor-
mation.294 Since all three proposed sales were “reasonably foreseeable,” 
the Forest Service was required to evaluate the cumulative effects of all 
sales on the old-growth forest area.295 
 The Tenth Circuit in another Forest Service case stated that it is not 
the court’s place to second guess the prudence of the Agency’s final 
choice or its conclusion regarding the extent of the proposed project’s 
indirect cumulative effects.296 “Rather, we must examine the administra-
tive record, as a whole, to determine whether the Forest Service made a 
reasonable, good faith, objective presentation of those impacts sufficient 
to foster public participation and informed decision making.”297 
 The NEPA rules, discussed above, were developed prior to climate 
change becoming an issue of concern, and it will be a challenge to in-
tegrate climate change analysis into the NEPA process because its im-
pacts are both indirect and cumulative.298 Most proposed actions have 
little, if any, potential for modification in order to prevent climate 
change and could result in costly delays to produce data with little or 
no relevance for a federal decisionmaker.299 
II. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Oil and Gas Development 
 The United States obtains about 85% of its energy from natural 
gas, coal, and oil.300 Petroleum supplies about 36% and natural gas 
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about 25% of the nation’s energy.301 Domestic petroleum production 
in 2010 accounted for about 51% of U.S. consumption302—the United 
States is well positioned to obtain its natural gas from domestic 
sources.303 In 2010, the nation consumed over 23 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, of which only approximately 3.7 trillion cubic feet were net 
imports.304 Much of the potential expansion of oil and gas production 
involves activities that require compliance with NEPA. 
 In New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Management, New 
Mexico and a coalition of environmental organizations challenged the 
Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) land management plan for fluid 
mineral development in New Mexico’s Otero Mesa, the nation’s largest 
area of publicly owned, undisturbed Chihuahuan Desert grassland.305 
The land serves as a habitat for endangered species and contains ap-
proximately fifteen million acre-feet of potable ground water.306 This 
case concerned NEPA, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and the 
ESA.307 The court found that the BLM’s conclusions in its EIS, which 
covered its resource management plan (RMP) under FLPMA, were ar-
bitrary and capricious.308 The EIS was rejected because the BLM con-
cluded that the impacts on the aquifer would be minimal, despite evi-
dence suggesting that non-trivial impacts were possible.309 Moreover, 
the BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing an oil and gas de-
velopment lease without conducting a site-specific EIS.310 The BLM also 
acted outside the scope of its DEIS when it adopted a new management 
plan without preparing a SEIS.311 For these reasons, the court required 
the BLM to conduct further site-specific analysis prior to leasing.312 
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 In Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, environmental groups 
challenged the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) approval of a 
plan to drill oil wells off the coast of Alaska.313 In 2002, the MMS issued 
a five-year leasing plan and, in 2003, prepared a detailed EIS on the 
planned oil exploration, which included both an extensive program to 
monitor the bowhead whale and a conflict avoidance process.314 Lease 
sales occurred in 2003, 2004, and 2006, and a supplemental environ-
mental assessment was prepared for each sale “tiered” to the original 
EIS.315 Kempthorne involved the 2004 lease sale.316 The lessee, Shell Off-
shore Inc., prepared an exploratory plan (EP) as required by the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act.317 During the EP approval process, ex-
perts within the MMS voiced concerns regarding the potential impact 
of drilling on bowhead whales, polar bears, and the Inupiat subsistence 
harvest.318 Nevertheless, the MMS issued an eighty-seven page EA and 
FONSI.319 
 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit found that the MMS “ha[d] not 
provided a convincing statement of reasons explaining why Shell’s ex-
ploratory drilling plans at these specific sites would have an insignificant 
impact on bowhead whales and Inupiat subsistence activities.”320 The 
court held that the MMS had not taken a “hard look” at the environ-
mental effects of the project, as required by NEPA.321 The MMS could 
not rely on the previous EIS to avoid a site-specific analysis of the im-
pact on whales.322 The proposed monitoring program did not qualify as 
mitigation that could be used to avoid the impact of potentially harm-
ful action.323 The MMS also failed to take a “hard look” at the effects of 
the project on the Inupiat.324 The agency could not rely on a mitigation 
measure unless it was supported by data analysis regarding its effective-
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ness.325 The court found the “conflict avoidance agreement process [to 
be] too vague and uncertain as a mitigation measure to justify the 
agency’s decision not to engage in further analysis.”326 Moreover, such 
agreements cannot be used to avoid the agency’s NEPA obligations.327 
The court also criticized the MMS’s failure to sufficiently analyze the 
impacts of the project on fish populations.328 The court vacated the 
agency’s approval of the EP and remanded the case to the MMS to pre-
pare a revised EA or, if necessary, an EIS.329 After this decision Shell 
withdrew its EP on May 5, 2009, and the MMS later withdrew its prior 
approval thereof.330 Because the MMS considered the EP to be null and 
void, the petitioner’s case was moot, and therefore the case was dis-
missed.331 
 In San Luis Valley Ecosystem Council v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, en-
vironmental groups successfully moved for a preliminary injunction to 
prevent oil and gas activities on the Baca National Wildlife Refuge 
(Refuge) until the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) complied 
with NEPA.332 The federal government owned the surface rights to the 
Refuge, but a private party held the mineral rights and the right to use 
the surface.333 After the USFWS issued a permit to drill on the land, 
local conservation groups filed a lawsuit. 334 
 Plaintiffs asserted the following claims against the USFWS: 
(1) violation of NEPA by failing to conduct NEPA analysis be-
fore “reviewing, accepting, authorizing, approving, regulating, 
and/or assisting with Lexam’s staking/survey activities, geo-
physical explorations, and other activities” on the Refuge; (2) 
violation of NEPA by authorizing activity during the ongoing 
NEPA process, particularly by taking action that will “limit the 
choice of reasonable alternatives in the ongoing development 
of the Comprehensive Conservation Plan”; (3) violation of 
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NEPA by issuing an Environmental Assessment which failed to 
take a hard look at the direct, indirect, and cumulative im-
pacts of the . . . proposal to drill oil and gas wells in the Ref-
uge; (4) violation of NEPA by failing to analyze a full range of 
alternative courses of actions; (5) violation of NEPA by issuing 
a Finding of No Significant Impact despite the existence of 
significant impacts which require preparation of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement; and (6) violation of NEPA by un-
lawfully denying Saguache County’s request to participate as a 
“cooperating agency.”335 
 The court concluded that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evi-
dence that drilling could cause irreversible harm, including soil distur-
bance and dust, which could harm endangered species and interfere 
with the generation of baseline data required to develop a Comprehen-
sive Conservation Plan.336 The USFWS asserted that the plaintiffs’ ap-
prehensions related to extensive development and drilling of the entire 
area, rather than to the mere creation of two exploratory wells.337 The 
Agency posited that if extensive oil and gas reserves were revealed, the 
USFWS would perform an additional NEPA analysis before commercial 
development of the area occurred.338 The USFWS also contended that 
plaintiffs’ claims were speculative and no irreversible harm would occur 
due to the existence of sufficient safeguards to protect and mitigate the 
effects of the proposed drilling.339 Lastly, the Agency argued that “the 
Final EA specifically addressed issues such as sedimentation, impact on 
aquifers, harm to the Rio Grande sucker fish, noise and visual impacts, 
and effect on wildlife migrations.”340 
 The Final EA noted that although the oil and gas activities would 
disturb the soil and create dust, which could be mitigated through wa-
tering, the watering might itself cause environmental consequences 
such as runoff, soil erosion, and sedimentation.341 The EA acknowl-
edged that full vegetation recovery could take fifteen to twenty years, 
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which the court opined “may constitute irreparable damage.”342 If the 
process were allowed to go forward, the court noted, alternative actions 
would no longer be available and the damage would be irreparable.343 
 Plaintiffs first questioned whether the USFWS should have carried 
out an examination under NEPA before allowing seismic testing.344 Al-
though the court did not rule on the issue, there is persuasive authority 
supporting the contention that the Agency’s grant of access for surface 
drilling could be considered a federal action under NEPA.345 Such fed-
eral action triggers the NEPA process, which requires analysis of “not 
only the direct impacts of a proposed action, but also the indirect and 
cumulative impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 
actions.”346 Plaintiffs argued that the impact analysis under NEPA was 
flawed because it failed to scrutinize the potential risks involved when 
introducing hazardous substances to the site during the drilling proc-
ess.347 The USFWS agreed that the hazardous substances used in the 
project had the potential to harm the Refuge but maintained that the 
proposed mitigation measures would protect its resources.348 
 The court found that the FONSI was issued despite the fact that 
the EA did not develop or assess significant mitigation measures, such 
as spill prevention and storm water management.349 Such cursory anal-
ysis was not sufficient to show that the decision to issue a FONSI was 
supported by substantial evidence.350 Moreover, evidence showed that 
the USFWS may not have actually appraised the effectiveness of many 
of the proposed protections.351 For example, the final EA stated that 
water-based drilling fluids would be used in certain situations, but there 
was no further discussion of potential hazards created by their use or 
the use of alternative substances.352 
 The court also found that the manner in which the agency framed 
its choices was inadequate because the result was essentially predeter-
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mined.353 The USFWS “construed its alternatives as prohibiting all drill-
ing, permitting drilling with no conditions, or permitting drilling with 
the conditions agreed to by the parties.”354 The Agency dismissed the 
prohibition of all drilling as an unreasonable option because the gov-
ernment did not own the mineral rights to the property.355 Further, al-
lowing drilling with no conditions would clearly lead to significantly 
more harm to the Refuge than the parties’ proposal.356 Finally, the 
court noted that the USFWS’s insistence that the applicable federal ac-
tion consisted of the conditions it placed on the private drilling, rather 
than the drilling itself, may have been arbitrary and capricious because 
it foreclosed the possibility of exploring alternative drilling proce-
dures.357 The court concluded that “‘an agency may not define a project 
so narrowly that it forecloses a reasonable consideration of alterna-
2 therefore each of three drilling proposals was preceded 
                                                                                                                     
tives.’”358 
 In Sierra Club v. Mainella, the district court ruled on an EA and 
FONSI in which the National Park Service (NPS) allowed oil and gas 
drilling operations under the Big Thicket National Preserve (BTNP).359 
The NPS controls private oil and gas drilling activities in areas covered 
by the National Park System, pursuant to the National Park Service Or-
ganic Act.360 A private company sought to drill at an angle from private 
land to oil reserves under park land; however, the approval of such di-
rectional drilling requires that the NPS issue a “no significant threat” 
determination.361 Prior to such a determination, the NPS must comply 
with NEPA,36
by an EA.363 
 The NPS recognized that the BTNP surface activities would gener-
ate a range of impacts, but they found that the impacts were not signifi-
cant enough to necessitate comprehensive analysis.364 For example, the 
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NPS expected that construction activities, particularly in the drilling 
phase, would increase air pollution.365 The NPS concluded, however, 
that no further analysis was necessary because the impacts would occur 
“at low intensity levels, with localized, short- to long-term, negligible to 
minor, adverse impacts.”366 Issues concerning artificial lighting, noise, 
water pollution, erosion, floodplain and wetland impacts, drainage 
from the site, and spills were similarly found to have “no impact” or 
were manageable by operational mitigation measures.367 Therefore, 
es
d capricious and re-
                                                                                                                     
th e effects were not analyzed in exacting detail.368 
 The court found that the NPS had failed to comply with the Na-
tional Park Service Organic Act’s requirements and remanded the case 
for further explanation.369 It also held that the NPS’s NEPA analysis 
lacked an explanation of how the agency reached its conclusion, rather 
it generally described the environmental effects of a certain action and 
concluded that the impact was “not significant” or some other similarly 
vague descriptor.370 For example, the NPS stated that catastrophic 
events such as fires, spills, and blowouts had a low probability of occur-
ring without any definition of low, or data in the record concerning 
how that conclusion was reached.371 Moreover, the NPS did not suffi-
ciently explain why they dismissed issues from the required detailed 
scoping analysis, nor did the Agency properly evaluate the cumulative 
effects of the drilling operations.372 Thus, the court found the NPS’s 
decision to issue three FONSIs was arbitrary an
manded the case for NPS to prepare a new EA.373 
 In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, environmental or-
ganizations challenged an EA and a FONSI issued by the BLM for seis-
mic oil and gas exploration on approximately 57,500 acres of public 
and private land in eastern Utah.374 Part of the project consisted of im-
aging surface geology to discover potential oil and natural gas re-
sources using “seismic reflection methods,” which involve “the genera-
 
 
365 Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 85. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. at 85–86, 88. 
369 Id. at 94–103. 
370 Id. at 106. 
371 Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 108. 
372 Id. at 107. 
373 Id. at 108. 
374 326 F. Supp. 2d 102, 105 (D.D.C. 2004). 
324 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39:283 
tion of ground vibrations or seismic waves, and the recording of seismic 
waves at source points and receiver points that would be located 
ro
 that the BLM created,380 including nearly 
l o
The court reviewed the BLM’s compliance with the NHPA and the ap-
                                                                                                                     
th ughout the project area, respectively.”375 
 The plaintiffs claimed that the vibrations could harm cultural 
landmarks in the region, including rock art and pit houses created by 
early civilizations.376 The project area covered 5300 acres of the Nine 
Mile Canyon Special Recreation and Cultural Management Area 
(SRCMA), an area specially designated for the protection and preserva-
tion of historic resources and containing the Nine Mile Canyon Ar-
chaeological District, which is eligible for inclusion in the National Reg-
ister of Historic Places.377 Over 1000 historically valuable sites have 
been recorded in the SRCMA, most of which are rock art, which ranges 
from rather simple to quite elaborate structures.378 The area also con-
tains remnants of prehistoric cultures, such as “cliff dwellings, masonry 
granaries, slab storage cists, semi-subterranean pit houses, [and] retain-
ing walls.”379 The project area also encompassed portions of two wil-
derness study areas (WSAs)
al f Jack Canyon WSA.381 
 On April 30, 2004, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent initiation of the project.382 After a hearing, however, the 
parties reached an agreement.383 Thus, the plaintiffs withdrew their 
injunction motion, and the parties continued to summary judgment.384 
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plicable regulations.385 The primary concern was that the seismic vibra-
tions would damage the cultural resources.386 The court however, de-
ferred to the BLM’s scientific and technical conclusions and supported 
the agency’s final determination.387 
 The court then turned to the NEPA compliance issues. The plain-
tiffs argued that the “BLM violated NEPA through its: (1) failure to 
prepare an EA that properly analyzed the cumulative effects of the pro-
ject; (2) failure to prepare an EIS; and (3) failure to supplement exist-
ing NEPA analysis based on the discovery of new information.”388 The 
court ruled that the agency gave a realistic evaluation of the total im-
pacts of the project and that the EA met NEPA’s requirements.389 The 
BLM analyzed the potential cumulative effects of the project through-
out the EA, even dedicating an entire chapter to cumulative impact 
analysis.390 In addition to discussing the effects of past and present ac-
tions, the BLM considered the impact of future actions and the cumu-
lative effects of all activities.391 For example, the agency acknowledged 
the region’s current air pollution contributors, evaluated the additional 
effects produced by the project, and then decided that the project 
would result in a temporary dust increase.392 Due in part to the fact 
that the anticipated area of disturbance created by the project covered 
only 11.5 acres of the 57,500 acre project area, the court held that the 
BLM had sufficiently assessed the project’s cumulative effects.393 
                                                                                                                     
 The court then evaluated whether the BLM’s decision not to pro-
duce an EIS was appropriate.394 Plaintiffs argued that the project area is 
unique for its “rock art, cliff dwellings, pit houses, and wilderness study 
areas.”395 The court held, however, that “[t]he determination of wheth-
er BLM should have prepared an EIS turns largely on whether the EA 
was adequately conducted and properly took cumulative impacts into 
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account,” which was the case here.396 Specifically, the court found that 
concerns about the area’s uniqueness and cultural value had already 
been covered by the procedures undertaken by the BLM pursuant to 
the NHPA, including special surveys designed to optimize the preserva-
tion of cultural artifacts.397 Furthermore, independent opinions pro-
vided evidence that the environmental and cultural effects of the ex-
ploration would be minimal.398 
 The court noted that it plays a limited role when reviewing an 
agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS—it is required only to confirm 
that the agency has not overlooked any substantial environmental con-
sequences and should not overturn the agency’s determination unless 
it is arbitrary and capricious.399 Given such deference, the court ruled 
that the BLM’s decision to issue a FONSI was appropriate.400 The court 
concluded its NEPA analysis with the determination that plaintiffs had 
not provided any “new” information that presented significant consid-
erations not already addressed, and thus the court did not require sup-
plementation of the EA.401 The court then granted summary judgment 
to the defendants.402 
 Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne involved envi-
ronmental plaintiffs challenging a FEIS produced by the BLM as part 
of its effort to lease 8.8 million acres of the Northwest Planning Area of 
Alaska for oil and gas exploration.403 Plaintiffs claimed that the FEIS 
failed to evaluate properly “site specific environmental consequences, 
failed to consider reasonable alternatives, did not discuss mitigation 
measures, and did not assess the cumulative impacts of leasing and 
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other activities plaintiffs claim to be reasonably foreseeable.”404 The 
BLM based its FEIS on a resource-by-resource analysis, but it did not 
assess the effects of the exploration and development on specified indi-
vidual parcels.405 The Ninth Circuit, in affirming its grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the government, supported the concept of impos-
ing site-specific standards when individual parcels are subject to an “ir-
retrievable commitment of resources.”406 
 The court recognized two categories of leases— “no surface occu-
pancy” (NSO) leases that do not require an EIS and non-NSO leases 
that do.407 The court noted that the case involved leases more similar to 
non-NSO leases, and thus the BLM prepared an EIS as required.408 
NEPA does not require multi-stage projects to cover the totality of envi-
ronmental effects that cannot be determined in early stages.409 Leasing, 
exploration, and development stages of projects require EIS analysis of 
the environmental effects when they are identifiable.410 The court held 
that the EIS satisfied NEPA’s requirements for an analysis of alternatives 
because the agency is only required to consider an appropriate range of 
alternatives, not every available one.411 Plaintiffs argued that the EIS did 
not cover mitigation measures appropriately, but the court noted that 
NEPA only requires a “reasonably complete discussion” and does not 
require an agency to adopt a complete mitigation plan at this stage.412 
For the same reason the court held that the cumulative impacts analysis 
need not be addressed until a later stage.413 
 In League for Coastal Protection v. Norton, the district court granted 
summary judgment to environmental plaintiffs based on a failure by 
the MMS to comply with NEPA and the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA).414 The MMS granted suspensions for thirty-six oil and gas 
leases located off the central California coast without conducting the 
environmental analysis required by NEPA, or the consistency review 
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required by the CZMA.415 The MMS issued six final EAs and a FONSI 
for the leases without considering the potential environmental impact 
of exploration and development activities that would occur after the 
suspension.416 The MMS sanctioned acoustic surveys in a number of 
leases during the suspension period.417 The MMS argued, however, that 
it did not have to address any proposed exploration and drilling activi-
ties, even though one lessee planned to drill the day the suspension 
expired.418 The court rejected this argument and remanded the EAs 
and the FONSI to the MMS.419 
 In Native Village of Point Hope v. Salazar, environmental groups and 
an Alaskan village sued Interior, among others, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief to prevent oil and gas leasing of approximately 29.4 
million acres of the Chuckchi Sea.420 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
MMS’s FEIS violated NEPA, the ESA, and the APA.421 Plaintiffs alleged 
that the EIS: (1) did not provide satisfactory analysis on the environ-
mental and community effects of Lease Sale 193; (2) failed to include 
necessary information about the harmful future effects on the Chuck-
chi Sea or any explanation as to why the information was omitted; (3) 
failed to analyze the lease sale in light of a warming climate; (4) mini-
mized the potential harm of oil and gas development by looking only at 
a situation of limited development; (5) underestimated the potential 
harms of an oil spill; (6) failed to assess fully the cumulative effects 
from oil and gas development on eiders and their habitat, both of 
which are threatened; and, (7) deceivingly depicted the effect of seis-
mic surveying.422 The allegedly inadequate EIS exceeded 1800 pages, 
including nearly 300 pages of discussion of the action’s potential im-
pacts and a 76 page assessment of possible cumulative effects.423 The 
court observed that, when reviewing agency action involving issues of 
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fact that require highly technical analysis, it “must defer to the in-
formed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.”424 
 Although the MMS is required to conduct a NEPA analysis at each 
stage of its four-stage mineral leasing process, a more detailed review 
process requiring an EIS only occurs at the later stages, which includes 
site-specific analysis.425 The MMS grants leases during the second stage, 
but the lease itself does not provide full exploration, development, or 
production rights.426 Instead, the lessee only obtains priority to submit 
plans which are subject to agency approval.427 The Ninth Circuit previ-
ously explained that natural resource development projects generally 
entail separate stages of leasing, exploration, and development.428 In 
the beginning stages of leasing, it is impossible to be certain of future 
plans for development.429 Plaintiffs argued, however, that as soon as the 
leases are granted the lessee obtains important rights, including the 
ability to conduct seismic surveying and drilling without MMS over-
sight.430 Furthermore, the government only has the power to suspend 
or terminate the leases if it concludes that there is a possibility of harm 
to the environment, which could expose the agency to substantial liabil-
ity with respect to the lessees.431 
 Plaintiffs argued that the MMS did not take the required hard look 
at the impacts of seismic surveying and the cumulative effects of the 
activities on the threatened eiders.432 The court, however, held that the 
agency did take a hard look and reasoned that essential mitigation steps 
could occur later, in the third and fourth phases of leasing.433 Plaintiffs 
further protested that the EIS failed to analyze natural gas develop-
ment, even though there was industry interest and lease incentives for 
such development, and only assessed the minimum possible level of oil 
development.434 The court held, however, that even this minimum level 
of examination with respect to potential oil development satisfied the 
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hard look requirement.435 Conversely, the court agreed with the plain-
tiffs that incentivizing natural gas production without examining its ef-
fects was arbitrary.436 The court stated that “[t]he agency cannot have 
taken a ‘hard look’ at the impact of natural gas exploration if natural 
gas development is omitted entirely from the EIS.”437 NEPA regulations 
place certain obligations on agencies acting without all the information 
necessary to evaluate a project’s impacts.438 The MMS’s analysis ex-
cluded relevant information regarding characteristics of the Chukchi 
Sea and the effects the lease sale would have on wildlife and subsis-
tence.439 Specifically, the plaintiffs noted that potentially hundreds of 
conclusions in the EIS were missing data regarding species of wildlife 
and their habitat, as well as the effects of leasing thereon.440 The court 
found that the MMS failed to obtain relevant and essential information, 
and thus the Agency failed to comply with the regulation.441 
 The court found that the agency: 
(1) failed to analyze the environmental impact of natural gas 
development, despite industry interest and specific lease in-
centives for such development; (2) failed to determine wheth-
er missing information identified by the agency was relevant or 
essential under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22; and (3) failed to deter-
mine whether the cost of obtaining the missing information 
was exorbitant, or the means of doing so unknown.442 
The court held that this deficiency did not require the MMS to un-
dergo a new permitting process, but instructed the agency to reassess 
its three specific failures.443 Otherwise, the court found the agency’s 
actions to be compliant with NEPA.444 
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A. Potential Litigation Opportunities Concerning Natural Gas Fracking 
 Natural gas provides about 25% of the primary energy used in the 
United States,445 and almost 90% was produced domestically in 2010.446 
In addition, it was used to generate 24% of the nation’s electricity in 
2010.447 Production of natural gas in 2009 was at its highest level since 
1973, primarily as a result of expanded development of shale gas.448 In 
2010, natural gas withdrawals in the United States were up by nearly 
25% from 1990.449 Much of the growth in natural gas production 
comes from unconventional gas, which includes gas from shale and 
tight sand formations.450 Since 1998, production from non-traditional 
sources increased by at least 65%, accounting for 46% of domestic pro-
duction in 2007.451 
                                                                                                                     
 Shale gas constituted 23% of U.S. natural gas production in 2010 
and is expected to increase to 49% by 2035.452 Much of the increase in 
natural gas production involves producing shale gas through hydraulic 
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theory that the Agency failed to properly consider the area’s wilderness characteristics. See 
id. 
On June 23, 2011, various environment-oriented government agencies signed a memo-
randum of understanding. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, EPA, Memoran-
dum of Understanding Regarding Air Quality Analyses & Mitigation for Fed. Oil & 
Gas Decisions Through the Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act Process 1, 17 ( June 23, 2011), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/air-quality-analyses-
mou-2011.pdf. The signatories of this memorandum committed “to a clearly defined, effi-
cient approach to compliance with [NEPA] regarding air quality and air quality related val-
ues, such as visibility, in connection with oil and gas development on Federal lands.” Id. at 1. 
445 What Are the Major Sources and Users of Energy in the United States?, U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/major_energy_sources_and_users.cfm (last up- 
dated Oct. 25, 2011). 
446 What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www. 
eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (last updated February 14, 2012) [here-
inafter Shale Gas]. 
447 What is the Role of Coal in the United States?, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www. 
eia.gov/energy_in_brief/role_coal_us.cfm (last updated May 27, 2011). 
448 Natural Gas Year-In-Review 2009, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/ 
naturalgas/review/archive/ngyir2009/ngyir2009.html (last updated July 2010). 
449 See U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. http://tonto.eia. 
gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9010us2a.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2012). 
450 See Natural Gas Year-In-Review 2009, supra note 448. 
451 J. Daniel Arthur et al., ALL Consulting, Hyrdraulic Fracturing Considera-
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fracturing, also called “fracking,”453 a practice that has long been used 
by the oil and gas industry and is regulated by the states.454 Advances in 
horizontal drilling technology and hydraulic fracturing, combined with 
rapid increases in natural gas prices, have made shale gas production 
economically viable.455 Shale gas is found in shale “plays” that are low-
permeable geological formations.456 Two substantial plays are the Bar-
nett Shale play in Texas and the Marcellus Shale play in the northeast-
ern United States.457 
 The fracking process involves injecting pressurized fluids to frac-
ture rock hydraulically, creating or enhancing cracks through which oil 
or natural gas can flow to a well.458 Fracking of shale formations to ob-
tain natural gas provides low cost gas from domestic sources, but it may 
have significant adverse environmental impacts.459 Large amounts of 
water are used for hydraulic fracking fluid.460 Many chemicals with 
toxic qualities are used and, while the concentrations are low, the mil-
lions of gallons of fracking fluid used create waste-disposal problems 
and may have adverse health effects.461 Moreover, methane released 
from the extraction process and leaks in pipes used to transport the gas 
may have global warming impacts because methane is a greenhouse gas 
(GHG) that is twenty times more potent than carbon dioxide over a 
100-year period.462 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempts fracking 
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from federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 
except when diesel is used as part of the fluid.463 On March 18, 2010, 
the EPA announced it was commencing a study to evaluate the poten-
tial risks to ground water from fracking pursuant to a mandate in its 
2010 appropriations law,464 however a year later it still had not pro-
posed any regulations.465 In June 2011, the EPA sent proposed oil and 
gas sector air quality regulations to the Office of Management and 
Budget.466 Congress has also introduced legislation that would give the 
EPA authority to regulate fracking under the SDWA.467 Another pro-
posed bill would modify the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act to allow states to require disclosure of chemicals 
used in fracking operations.468 Given the gridlock in Congress, how-
ever, new legislation does not appear to be close to enactment.469 
                                                                                                                     
B. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Coalbed Methane 
 Coalbed methane (CBM) is a resource used to increase natural gas 
production.470 The Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana and 
the San Juan Basin in Colorado and New Mexico, as well as areas in 
North Dakota and Utah, are some of the major CBM producing areas 
in the United States.471 Environmental issues include the use of water 
for hydraulic fracturing and the resulting discharge of contaminated 
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water.472 CBM also produces environmentally-harmful water disposal 
sites, drill pad sites, new roads, and other infrastructure development, 
as well as cause adverse impacts on wildlife.473 The adverse environ-
mental impacts of CBM production frequently results in NEPA-based 
legal challenges.474 
 In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, an Indian Tribe and environ-
mentalists challenged an EIS prepared by the BLM to allow coalbed 
methane development in the Powder River Basin in Montana and Wy-
oming.475 The district court generally upheld the EIS but issued a par-
tial injunction until the BLM prepared a revised EIS that considered an 
additional alternative.476 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court 
in a decision that evaluated NEPA’s requirement to consider alterna-
tives, and provided guidance concerning the level of effort required to 
prepare an adequate EIS.477 
 CBM production involves pumping groundwater that contains 
natural gas generated by coal deposits.478 Industrial CBM operations 
create environmental problems on land surfaces belonging to farmers 
and ranchers because the pumped ground water pollutes rivers and 
streams, and lowers the water table.479 The DEIS in this case analyzed 
five alternatives: “(A) No Action (Existing Management); (B) Empha-
size Soil, Water, Air, Vegetation, Wildlife, and Cultural Resources; (C) 
Emphasize CBM Development; (D) Encourage Exploration and Devel-
opment While Maintaining Existing Land Uses; [and] (E) Preferred 
Alternative that would facilitate CBM exploration and development 
while sustaining resource and social values, and existing land uses.”480 
The BLM’s preferred alternative would limit drilling to one well per 
640 acres unless the party produced “a project plan developed in con-
                                                                                                                      
 
472 See id. at 21–22; see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 
1471 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining the potential for contamination caused by hydraulic 
fracturing of coal beds). 
473 Ingelson & Mitchell, supra note 470, at 22. 
474 See, e.g., infra notes 475–525 and accompanying text. 
475 503 F.3d 836, 839–41 (9th Cir. 2007). The BLM was involved because the federal 
government owns most of the subsurface in the Powder River Basin and manages the re-
source using management plans developed under FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2006); 
Norton, 503 F.3d at 839–40. 
476 Norton, 503 F.3d at 841. 
477 Id. at 841, 846. 
478 Id. at 839. 
479 Id. at 839–40. 
480 Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2012] NEPA & Resource Development in the Western United States 335 
sultation with the affected surface owners and permitting agencies.”481 
An additional NEPA analysis would be required for a drilling permit.482 
The Ninth Circuit generally upheld the EIS but granted a partial in-
junction allowing phased development to proceed in tandem with the 
BLM’s preparation of a SEIS.483 
 In Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the Tenth 
Circuit instructed a district court to reinstate an Interior Board of Land 
Appeals (IBLA) decision that BLM-issued oil and gas leases violated 
NEPA.484 This case raised the question of whether the BLM satisfied 
NEPA requirements prior to auctioning three oil and gas leases for ex-
tracting CBM in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming.485 The issue was 
whether the environmental impacts created by CBM varied substantially 
from conventional oil and gas development such that the Agency 
should have prepared a new EIS before issuing the leases.486 The IBLA 
found that the BLM had neither made an adequate site-specific envi-
ronmental review nor addressed the quantity of water production from 
CBM extraction and critical air quality issues.487 The district court, after 
reviewing the record, reversed the IBLA decision and reinstated the 
BLM’s issuance of the leases.488 The Tenth Circuit found that the ad-
ministrative record contained evidence to support the “IBLA’s conclu-
sion that water production associated with CBM extraction is signifi-
cantly greater than the water production associated with non-CBM oil 
and gas development.”489 The court also found that the record con-
tained substantial evidence that CBM development poses unique air 
quality concerns not addressed in the EIS.490 The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the IBLA’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious 
and reinstated its decision.491 
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 In January 2011, the Forest Service released a final SEIS which nul-
lified thirty-five existing oil and gas leases.492 The Forest Service se-
lected the “No Action” alternative in its SEIS even though the thirty-five 
leases had been the subject of a successful bid.493 The Forest Service 
subsequently withdrew its decision barring the BLM from leasing the 
land, however, and decided to conduct further analysis to prepare an-
other SEIS.494 
 In Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a district 
court ruled on environmental groups’ challenge of a CWA permit al-
lowing release of CBM water into above-ground reservoirs as dredge 
and fill material.495 The district court held that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ (Corps) failure to sufficiently consider cumulative impacts 
violated NEPA,496 because it only considered the cumulative impacts in 
relation to wetlands.497 Additionally, the Corps failed to consider effects 
on privately-owned ranchlands with no mineral rights.498 The court re-
fused to defer to the Corps because of their reliance on mitigation 
measures without evidentiary support.499 The Corps was not required 
to undertake statewide analysis of cumulative impacts of all CBM devel-
opment, but it should have assessed cumulative impacts likely related to 
the permit.500 
 The Corps is not responsible for CBM development on public 
lands that other federal agencies manage.501 It is also not responsible 
for drilling on private lands so long as the drilling does not involve the 
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discharge of dredge and fill material into U.S. waters.502 The Supreme 
Court, in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, held that when an 
agency “has no ability to prevent a certain effect,” the agency does not 
cause the impact.503 Still, the Corps must assess the cumulative impacts 
of CBM development projects in order to determine whether there will 
be significant environmental impacts.504 The court remanded the case 
to the Corps for further analysis of impacts on ranchlands, efficacy of 
mitigation measures, and cumulative impacts.505 
 In Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 
the Tenth Circuit considered NEPA-based challenges to resource man-
agement plans required pursuant to FLPMA.506 In the 1990s, federal 
lessees proposed drilling approximately 24,000 new CBM gas wells over 
a ten-year period in the Powder River Basin.507 Environmental plaintiffs 
asked the BLM to consider the alternative of phased development, clus-
tering drilling and draining coal seams one at a time.508 Reclamation 
would be required before drilling at a new site, delaying drilling at most 
potential sites for ten years or longer.509 
 The BLM’s FEIS contained detailed analysis of several alternative 
development plans, including “No Action,” but the Agency declined to 
study phased development in detail.510 The BLM cited six reasons for 
rejecting phased development, including its inability to meet the pro-
ject’s purposes.511 In 2003, the BLM approved a resource management 
plan, although it allowed for no site-specific activities.512 A site-specific 
NEPA analysis and compliance with approved mitigation requirements 
are needed to commence operations.513 The issue on appeal was 
whether the BLM abused its discretion by rejecting phased develop-
ment as an alternative management plan.514 The court held that the 
BLM’s rejection of phased development was reasonable, in part be-
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cause it would not meet “the Purpose of and Need for the Proposed 
Action” included in the FEIS.515 
 Although an appropriate management plan was required to help 
prevent drainage, the BLM reasonably believed that its regulatory tools 
were incapable of doing so effectively.516 Additionally, the Agency does 
not have the power to compel compensation from owners of state and 
private wells.517 Moreover, “the [BLM] cannot order a lessee to drill a 
protective well if environmental concerns caused the [BLM] to close 
the leasehold to drilling.”518 Rather, it can only demand a protective 
well if it can approve the well under a plan delaying development.519 
Furthermore, the BLM can only collect compensatory royalties if the 
lessee refuses to drill the protective well.520 Because phased develop-
ment would cause drainage and change reservoir pressure—resulting 
in a significant loss of gas—the BLM reasonably concluded that it 
would not effectively meet the project’s purpose of helping national 
energy needs.521 The Agency was justified in questioning whether de-
velopment could be delayed for decades.522 Its lessees’ right to drill is 
subject only to reasonable delays, and a decades-long wait is not rea-
sonable.523 The BLM’s decision rested on the adequate basis that 
phased development would not meet the project’s purposes and was 
not practical.524 The Tenth Circuit therefore declined to review other 
reasons for excluding phased development from detailed study and 
affirmed the lower court decision.525 
C. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Pipeline Construction 
 In Hammond v. Norton, Sinclair Oil, environmental groups, and in-
dividual landowners sued the Secretary of the Interior, the BLM, and 
other federal defendants to enjoin the construction of a 480 mile pipe-
line from Bloomfield, New Mexico to Salt Lake City, Utah, pending the 
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preparation of a SEIS.526 Plaintiffs asserted claims under NEPA, the 
Mineral Leasing Act, the ESA, and the National Forest Management 
Act (NFMA).527 The plaintiffs had partial success at the summary 
judgment phase because the BLM’s determination that the northern 
and southern pipelines had independent utility and were not “con-
nected action[s]” was arbitrary and capricious.528 Connected actions 
are those without an independent utility.529 As a result, the court re-
quired the BLM to prepare a SEIS.530 The project involved converting 
220 miles of natural gas pipeline to carry refined petroleum and con-
structing 260 miles of new pipeline, of which 96.95 miles would span 
federal lands.531 Another proposed pipeline would run from Odessa, 
Texas to Bloomfield, New Mexico; the two pipelines would allow trans-
port of petroleum products to Salt Lake City from West Texas and 
shipping terminals on the Texas Gulf Coast.532 The BLM is responsible 
for processing grants of rights-of-way across federal lands and did not 
consider the Texas to New Mexico pipeline to be a separate project in 
its NEPA review.533 
 BLM had initially decided to treat the Texas to Salt Lake City pipe-
line as one project, requiring one cumulative EIS.534 To avoid this, Wil-
liams Pipeline Company and the Equilon Pipeline LLC terminated 
their joint venture and treated the two projects separately.535 Shell Pipe-
line Company, the successor to Equilon, then planned to build the 
southern pipeline segment, while Williams would build the northern 
segment.536 Williams independently filed an amended application for a 
northern pipeline originating in Bloomfield, and requested that the 
application be considered independently of Equilon’s application.537 
BLM then submitted to the Federal Register a notice of intent to assess 
the Williams and Equilon pipelines separately—a decision based pri-
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marily on the dissolution of the two companies’ partnership and Wil-
liams’ assurance that it would not depend on Equilon to supply the 
northern pipeline.538 The separation of the projects elicited negative 
comments from numerous parties, including the EPA.539 The DEIS re-
leased by the BLM in March 2001 relied on Williams’s statements.540 
The court recognized the dubiousness of agencies simply trusting the 
“self-serving statements or assumptions” of involved parties when pre-
paring an EIS.541 The court noted that “the history of the [] project as a 
single connected pipeline, and the proponents’ manifest intention to 
circumvent the NEPA review process by segmenting the project, should 
have given BLM cause to question whether the dissolution of the [pipe-
line] partnership was of real or only formal significance.”542 
 The EPA’s position was that the CEQ did not demand a formal 
partnership in order for two actions to be treated as a joint project.543 
Plaintiffs asserted that the FEIS should include the environmental ef-
fects of the Equilon project because both it and the Williams pipeline 
represented “similar actions.”544 The court stated, “actions that are ‘sim-
ilar’ or ‘connected’ or that have cumulative effects must be considered 
together in one EIS.”545 Furthermore, the court asserted that “an agen-
cy preparing an EIS may not ‘segment’ its analysis so as to conceal the 
environmental significance of the project or projects.”546 
 The court found that Williams and Equilon intentionally at-
tempted to segment the analysis of the environmental impacts of the 
project in order to avoid NEPA requirements.547 The court, however, 
also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the two projects 
produced cumulative effects or were so similar as to require a com-
bined EIS.548 The BLM, however, acted arbitrarily in deciding, based on 
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its interpretation of the administrative record, that the Equilon and 
Williams pipelines were not “connected” actions.549 
 The BLM failed to independently confirm Williams’s “self-serving 
and unreliable statements about its petroleum supply arrangements in 
Bloomfield.”550 The BLM also failed to respond sufficiently to the EPA’s 
criticism of the DEIS or FEIS based on the history of the two pro-
jects.551 As a result, the court declared that the Agency violated NEPA 
and CEQ requirements by improperly segmenting its analysis of the 
Williams pipeline.552 Thus, the court remanded the case with instruc-
tion to prepare a SEIS regarding whether the Williams and Equilon 
projects constituted connected actions.553 
                                                                                                                     
 The plaintiffs further alleged that after the release of the FEIS and 
the October 12, 2001 Record of Decision (ROD), Williams’ parent 
company, the Williams Companies, deteriorated financially.554 The 
company’s resulting financial weakness cast doubt on its ability to com-
plete the project and fully remedy any adverse environmental impacts 
caused by the potential failure of the project.555 
 Thus, plaintiffs achieved success on the merits with respect to only 
one of their claims.556 The court agreed that the BLM acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in finding the Williams pipeline segment to have in-
dependent utility, and therefore the Agency improperly segmented its 
analysis in violation of NEPA and CEQ regulations.557 Despite the plain-
tiffs’ insistence that the BLM produce a SEIS reflecting the combined 
environmental effects of the two pipelines, the court held that the 
Agency need only offer concrete evidence that the projects were not 
connected actions.558 
 In National Committee for the New River v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the D.C. Circuit upheld two FERC approvals of applications 
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through southwest Virginia and North Carolina.559 An environmental 
organization challenged the Agency decision claiming that its DEIS was 
inadequate, its FEIS failed to adequately identify alternative routes for 
the pipeline, and asserted that in evaluating alternative routes the tap 
locations should not have been considered.560 In the alternative, if the 
locations were considered, the plaintiffs argued, the environmental 
impacts of the taps should have been considered in addition to those of 
the two proposed power plants to be connected to the pipeline.561 The 
D.C. Circuit held that the FERC’s approval of the project was not arbi-
trary or capricious.562 The environmental impacts of the project re-
ceived the requisite hard look, and any deficiencies in the draft were 
cured by the FEIS.563 This case demonstrates how difficult it is to over-
turn an agency’s NEPA review if the agency thoroughly covers the ele-
ments of an EIS as set forth in CEQ regulations.564 
 In South Coast Air Quality Management District v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 2007 EIS produced by the 
FERC.565 The case involved a challenge by the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (South Coast) to a FERC certificate that author-
ized the expansion and modification of the North Baja pipeline system, 
which would allow foreign-sourced natural gas to be shipped from Mex-
ico to the Los Angeles area.566 The NEPA-based issue involved gas speci-
fications based on the Wobbe Index.567 South Coast urged the FERC to 
consider the impact of emissions resulting from the use of the pipe-
line’s gas and to adopt mitigation measures.568 
 The Ninth Circuit evaluated the NEPA claims in the context of the 
FERC’s regulatory authority, which is shared with California’s Public 
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Utility Commission.569 NEPA cannot be used to expand an agency’s 
jurisdiction or expand its substantive powers.570 The court did not de-
cide whether the FERC has an obligation to consider the environ-
mental impacts caused by end users burning gas in the Basin because it 
had considered the issue in its 250-page EIS.571 The FERC’s FEIS re-
quired North Baja to only deliver gas that met the State of California’s 
strictest applicable quality standards.572 This means that the gas trans-
ported by the North Baja pipeline would not materially increase air pol-
lution.573 As the court noted, “FERC explicitly considered the environ-
mental impact of down-stream emissions and imposed what it 
reasonably believed to be effective measures to mitigate the impact.”574 
This requirement also satisfied the FERC’s obligation to consider input 
from other agencies, particularly the EPA’s suggestions.575 The court 
concluded that the “FERC’s EIS contains a reasonably thorough discus-
sion of the environmental impact of its actions, based on information 
then available to it. Consequently, NEPA’s goal of ‘informed agency 
action’ has been met.”576 After discussing other claims made by peti-
tioners, the court denied the petition for review.577 
                                                                                                                     
 An ongoing controversy that is likely to lead to litigation involves a 
plan to build the seven billion dollar Keystone XL pipeline, which would 
move high-carbon tar sands oil from Alberta, Canada to refineries near 
Houston, Texas.578 The State Department released a DEIS in April 2010, 
that concluded the project would have a minimal environmental im-
pact.579 Environmentalists oppose the project because the life cycle car-
bon emissions of oil produced from tar sands is about eighty-two per-
 
 
569 Id. 1092. 
570 Id. 
571 S. Coast Air Quality, 621 F.3d at 1093. 
572 Id. 
573 Id. 
574 Id. at 1093–94. 
575 Id. at 1094. 
576 Id. at 1095. 
577 S. Coast Air Quality, 621 F.3d at 1101. 
578 Pipeline Permit Delay May Allow State Dept. to Address GHG Concerns, 21 Clean Air Rep. 
(Inside Wash. Publishers) (Aug. 5, 2010); Lynn Garner, Republicans Push for Keystone Pipe-
line, Urge Clinton to Help Speed Permit Approval, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2851 (Dec. 31, 2010). 
579 Lynn Garner, Senators Ask Clinton for Thorough Review of Proposal for Canadian Oil Sands 
Pipeline, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2455 (Nov. 5, 2010). 
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cent greater than crude oil refined in the United States.580 The State 
Department agreed to expand its NEPA review of the permit application 
to construct the pipeline, and in April 2011, it released a supplemental 
review.581 A coalition of members of Congress, mostly liberal Democrats, 
however, is pressing the Department to perform a more complete analy-
sis of the GHG impacts.582 At the same time, the Department of Defense 
and conservative members of Congress are working to ensure that Ca-
nadian tar sands oil can be sold to federal agencies regardless of its 
GHG impacts.583 The EPA objects to the State Department’s draft SEIS, 
claiming that it does not contain the information required to fully assess 
the effects of the project.584 The EPA is concerned about the impacts to 
groundwater from spills, the effect on emission levels at Gulf Coast re-
fineries, GHG emissions and appropriate mitigation plans, the impacts 
on low-income communities near the refineries, and lifecycle GHG 
emission estimates that the EPA believes are underestimated by twenty 
percent.585 This project is now the target of the House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, which is pressuring the 
Obama Administration to approve the project.586 
 This controversy has international relations ramifications based on 
the reasoning found in Hirt v. Richardson. In that case, environmental 
groups brought a NEPA-based action against the DOE to enjoin a 
weapons-grade plutonium shipment from New Mexico to Canada for 
disposal in Canadian reactors.587 The court had previously declined to 
grant a preliminary injunction, allowing the defendants to complete 
the shipment to Canada.588 The court held the case was moot because 
                                                                                                                      
 
580 EPA Backs Growing Calls for GHG Analysis of Key Tar Sands Pipeline, 27 Envtl. Pol’y 
Alert (Inside Wash. Publishers) ( July 28, 2010). 
581 House Lawmakers Urge Stricter GHG Review for Keystone Pipeline Project, 22 Clean Air 
Rep. (Inside Wash. Publishers) ( June 9, 2011). 
582 Id. 
583 See Court Reviews Ban on CO2-Intense Federal Fuels, Congress Eyes Repeal, 22 Clean Air 
Rep. (Inside Wash. Publishers) ( June 9, 2011). 
584 Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Seeks More Environmental Analysis of Keystone Oil Sands Pipeline 
Project, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1297 ( June 10, 2011). 
585 Id. 
586 Alan Kovski, House Subcommittee Passes Bill to Move Up Decision on Canadian Oil Sands 
Pipeline, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1339 ( June 17, 2011). 
587 Hirt v. Richardson (Hirt II), 127 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
588 See id. at 851; Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 849, 852-53 (W.D. Mich. 
1999). 
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there was no longer an adequate remedy.589 The court was critical of 
DOE’s failure to properly deal with the environmental issues in its EA, 
but the court decided that the foreign policy and executive branch im-
plications of this case made the remedy of stopping the shipment be-
yond the equitable power of the court.590 
III. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Mining, Including Oil 
Shale and Oil Sand Development 
  In South Fork Band v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the South Fork 
Band Council of Western Shoshone of Nevada sued Interior and the 
BLM in an effort to stop a gold mining project on Mt. Tenabo in Ne-
vada, after the BLM issued a FEIS and approved the project.591 The 
plaintiffs in the lower court unsuccessfully argued for a preliminary in-
junction under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.592 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court after reversing 
the denial of injunctive relief on the NEPA claims.593 The court granted 
injunctive relief “pending preparation of an EIS that adequately con-
sider[ed] the environmental impact of the extraction of millions of 
tons of refractory ore, mitigation of the adverse impact on local springs 
and streams, and the extent of fine particulate emissions.”594 
 The project would impact 6571 acres of public land and 221 acres 
of land belonging to the project’s proponent.595 Petitioners argued that 
the project violated the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), 
which imposes a duty on the BLM to take action to prevent “unneces-
sary and undue degradation of the lands.”596 Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the Tribes failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success 
in establishing that the BLM acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, 
it ruled for the Tribes on the NEPA issues.597 The court also criticized 
the BLM’s failure to consider the environmental impact of transporting 
                                                                                                                      
 
589 Hirt II, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
590 Id. 
591 588 F.3d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2009). 
592 Id. at 721. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb 
to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
593 S. Fork Band, 588 F.3d at 722. 
594 Id. 
595 Id. 
596 Id. at 724; see 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2011). FLPMA is lo-
cated at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785. 
597 S. Fork Band, 588 F.3d at 721–22. 
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and processing the ore: “The air quality impacts associated with trans-
port and off-site processing of the five million tons of refractory ore are 
prime examples of indirect effects that NEPA requires be consid-
ered.”598 
 The fact that the facility operates with a state permit issued under 
the CAA does not satisfy the federal agency’s obligations under 
NEPA.599 The BLM may delegate its permitting authority to the states, 
but federal agencies must nevertheless comply with NEPA.600 Moreover, 
NEPA requires that the EIS discuss mitigation measures with “sufficient 
detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly 
evaluated.”601 The mitigation discussion must include an assessment of 
the effectiveness of any proposed mitigation measures.602 Before an 
agency carries out an action, NEPA requires that it take a hard look at 
the potential environmental impacts.603 The agency’s limited under-
standing of the science applicable to the project does not relieve it of its 
NEPA obligation to consider mitigations to the project’s potential im-
pacts.604 Finally, the court required the BLM modeling and analysis for 
fine particulates to reflect recent changes in the law.605 
 The issues concerning gold mining in the Mount Tenabo area re-
turned to the Ninth Circuit after the BLM approved an amendment to 
a plan of operations for an existing mineral exploration project in Ne-
vada.606 The Te-Moak Tribe and environmental organizations brought 
an action in the district court seeking summary judgment and alleging 
that the project violated NEPA, FLPMA, and the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA).607 The court denied the motion and the 
plaintiffs appealed.608 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
                                                                                                                      
 
598 Id. at 725. 
599 Id. at 726 (citing Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 
F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
600 See id. at 725; see also United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (describing federal agency as having authority to enforce CAA standards). 
601 S. Fork Band, 588 F.3d at 727 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 




605 Id. at 728. 
606 Te-Moak Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 595–96, 598 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
607 Id. at 598. 
608 Id. 
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holding that the BLM complied with the NHPA and FLPMA.609 The 
court reversed and remanded the case to the BLM, however, because 
the Agency failed to sufficiently analyze the cumulative impacts of the 
amended plan of operation as required by NEPA.610 The court allowed 
the BLM to make an assessment of exploration projects involving un-
certain locations of drill sites and other project activities by analyzing 
the impact of drilling, and imposing effective measures for avoidance 
and mitigation to account for unknown impacts in all parts of the pro-
ject area.611 
 The court noted that the BLM’s avoidance and mitigation meas-
ures for the protection of the cultural resources of the Western Sho-
shone tribes controlled the potential impacts of exploratory activi-
ties.612 If new cultural resources are discovered, miners must cease 
activities within 100 meters until the BLM determines whether the site 
can be included on the National Register of Historic Places and there-
fore should be protected by an exclusion zone.613 This provision would 
compensate for the mining company’s inability to identify the drill 
sites’ precise locations.614 The court then concluded that the BLM did 
not violate NEPA when it approved the amended plan of operation, 
though the exact locations of access roads, drill sites, and other project 
activities were as yet unknown.615 
 Plaintiffs argued that the BLM violated NEPA because of the in-
adequate discussion of reasonable alternatives in its EA.616 As the court 
noted, “[t]he purpose of NEPA is to require disclosure of relevant envi-
ronmental considerations that were given a ‘hard look’ by the agency, 
and thereby to permit informed public comment on proposed action 
and any choices or alternatives that might be pursued with less envi-
ronmental harm.”617 The court stated that agencies must consider al-
ternatives in an EIS as well as an EA, and are required to “give full and 
meaningful consideration to all reasonable alternatives.”618 The court 
                                                                                                                      
 
609 Id. at 611, 614. 
610 Id. at 607, 614. 
611 Id. at 600. 
612 Te-Moak Tribe, 608 F.3d at 600–01. 




617 Id. (quoting Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
618 Te-Moak Tribe, 608 F.3d at 601–02; see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (2011). 
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established that “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative 
renders an [EIS] inadequate.”619 “NEPA does not require a separate 
analysis of alternatives which are not significantly distinguishable from 
alternatives actually considered, or which have substantially similar con-
sequences.”620 Moreover, there is no requirement that more than two 
alternatives, the preferred alternative and the “No Action” alternative, 
be considered.621 
 An EA must include a cumulative impact analysis.622 Federal regu-
lations define a cumulative impact as “the impact on the environment 
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to 
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . . Cu-
mulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively 
significant actions taking place over a period of time.”623 An agency 
must take a hard look at all actions when preparing a cumulative im-
pact analysis,624 which “must give a sufficiently detailed catalogue of 
past, present, and future projects, and provide adequate analysis about 
how these projects, and differences between the projects, are thought 
to have impacted the environment.”625 Furthermore, “[g]eneral state-
ments about ‘possible effects’ and ‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard 
look’ absent a justification regarding why more definitive information 
could not be provided.”626 
 The court found that the coverage of the cultural resources and 
Native American religious concerns was inadequate because “the EA 
does not, in fact, discuss the existence of any cumulative impacts on 
these resources.”627 The Ninth Circuit considered Klamath-Siskiyou Wild-
lands Center v. Bureau of Land Management, where the court deemed EAs 
inadequate because they listed various environmental concerns (air 
and water quality, for example) next to checkboxes marked “No” to 
                                                                                                                      
 
619 Te-Moak Tribe, 608 F.3d at 602 (quoting Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 
F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
620 Id. at 602 (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 914 F.2d 1174, 1181 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
621 See id. at 602 n.11. 
622 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
623 Id. 
624 Te-Moak Tribe, 608 F.3d at 603. 
625 Id. (quoting Landa Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
626 Id. (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 
(9th Cir. 1998)). 
627 Id. at 604. 
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indicate that none of these factors would suffer any cumulative ef-
fects.628 The court found this insufficient because “[t]he EA[s][are] 
silent as to the degree that each factor will be impacted and how the 
project design will reduce or eliminate the identified impacts.”629 The 
court then observed that the EA failed to explain the unmitigated im-
pacts of expanded exploration and other existing proposed or foresee-
able activities in the Amendment, as required of the agency.630 The 
plaintiffs only needed to show a potential cumulative impact to meet 
their burden, which they did.631 
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the BLM’s cumulative impact 
analysis was insufficient, and therefore violated NEPA.632 The BLM 
failed to take a hard look at the cumulative impacts of both the amend-
ed plan of operation and other projects in the area, which NEPA re-
quires.633 On this issue, the court reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment to the defendants and required the BLM to conduct further 
analysis.634 Although the BLM took a hard look at the direct impacts of 
the amended plan the court concluded that the entirety of the BLM’s 
actions were arbitrary and capricious.635 
 More recently, the Ninth Circuit decided Greater Yellowstone Coali-
tion v. Lewis636—a case involving a challenge to a phosphate ore mining 
operation in the Caribou National Forest located in Idaho.637 A coali-
tion of environmental organizations challenged a proposed expansion 
of the mine because of concern over high levels of selenium created by 
mining operations, which are subject to a response action under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA).638 Plaintiffs claimed the expansion would violate NEPA, 
the CWA, and the NFMA.639 J.R. Simplot Company (Simplot) operated 
                                                                                                                      
 
628 387 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). 
629 Id. at 995. 
630 Te-Moak Tribe, 608 F.3d at 605. 
631 Id. 
632 Id. at 606. 
633 Id. 
634 Id. 
635 Id. at 606–07. 
636 628 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). 
637 Id. at 1146, 1148. 
638 Id. at 1146. CERCLA is located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
639 Lewis, 628 F.3d at 1146. CWA is located at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). NFMA is 
located at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1687 (2006). 
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the mine pursuant to two federal mineral leases,640 and sought ap-
proval from the BLM, which has jurisdiction over phosphate leases on 
public land, and the Forest Service, which has the authority to issue a 
special use permit for mining on forest system lands.641 The district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the 
motion for a preliminary injunction, which the Ninth Circuit af-
rm
Department of Environmental 
ua
                                                                                                                     
fi ed.642 
 The agencies released a FEIS in October 2007, which concluded 
that the mine expansion would not adversely impact water quality be-
cause Simplot was working to reduce pollution from its existing opera-
tions, and the company proposed a “store and release cover system” 
designed to reduce percolation.643 The company hired an independent 
consultant that used models to show that the total water percolating 
through the ground cover was within acceptable limits.644 The govern-
ment’s expert expressed doubt about the modeling, and additional re-
view of the studies failed to remove the uncertainty.645 The agencies, 
however, concluded that further study was unnecessary because Sim-
plot agreed to monitor the ground cover to ensure that it continued to 
perform as predicted.646 The Idaho 
Q lity agreed with this conclusion.647 
 The Ninth Circuit based its review on the APA’s “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 
standard.648 As stated by the court, “[a]gencies have discretion to rely 
on their own experts’ reasonable opinions to resolve a conflict between 
or among specialists, even if we find contrary views more persuasive.”649 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Caribou National Forest Plan re-
quired the implementation of state-of-the-art protocols to prevent haz-
ardous materials from being released at a level beyond those permitted 
 
 





uoting the APA standard of review, which can be found at 
5 U.
arsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)). 
640 Lewis, 628 F.3d at 1146. 
641 Id.; see 30 U.S.C. § 211 (2006);
642 Lewis, 628 F.3d at 1148,
643 Id. at 1146–4
644 Id. at 1147. 
645 Id. at 1147–4
646 Id. a
647 Id. 
648 Lewis, 628 F.3d at 1148 (q
S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)). 
649 Id. (citing M
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by state and federal regulations.650 The agencies determined that re-
mediation could sufficiently offset additional released selenium.651 Al-
though this determination was based on modeling that did not remove 
short-term uncertainty, the agency did not necessarily fail to consider 
the relevant elements of the problem.652 The court noted that “[t]he 
fact that the agencies relied on future testing to verify the model’s pre-
dictions does not invalidate the previous, rigorous evaluation the agen-
cies conducted.”653 As a result, NEPA’s hard look requirement was satis-
fied.654 The court was satisfied that, “[s]hould the testing reveal 
significant inadequacies or miscalculations in the modeling, the agen-
cies presumably are authorized to, and will require Simplot to, take 
corrective action.”655 NEPA only requires an evaluation of future envi-
ronmental impacts, and the agencies’ conclusion that remediation ef-
rts
                                                                                                                     
fo  would offset future pollution was reasonable.656 
 The dissenting opinion expressed the view that both “the letter and 
the spirit of the applicable federal environmental standards” were vio-
lated by the agencies’ actions because they failed to account for vital in-
formation and postponed necessary assessments until a later date.657 
Simplot was subject to a CERCLA-based removal order to clean up sele-
nium pollution, and there was no evidence that it had complied.658 
Simplot, however, is “at the helm of an industry that contributes millions 
of dollars annually to the economy of southeastern Idaho and western 
Wyoming.”659 Thus, substantial local economic interests support the 
company.660 The dissent identified three violations of federal law: (1) 
authorizing the expansion of the project on incomplete information 
concerning the sources of extant selenium pollution, and failing to de-





 it will take years for any effects of selenium pollu-
tion erialize fully. Id. at 1151 n.3. 
t 1153 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 





654 Lewis, 628 F.3d at 1150. 
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in ficient modeling to predict impacts on water quality; and (3) 
adopting post-decisional modeling rather than additional modeling.
suf
illingness to accept the flawed 
.671 The BLM behaved 
                                                                                                                     
661 
 The dissent objected to the majority’s conclusion that only future 
impacts need to be considered because Simplot’s prior mining activities 
polluted the area so significantly that a comprehensive evaluation of 
existing pollution would be necessary to inform any decision regarding 
remediation.662 The dissent stated that the agencies’ belief that reme-
diation of only two sources of selenium was necessary was irrational.663 
Moreover, the modeling method proposed by Simplot led the govern-
ment’s expert to notice that its conclusions were based on a limited 
understanding of the predicted effect of the cover system.664 Addition-
ally, the approval of the expansion allows another fourteen to sixteen 
years of operation, which is a time period in which the full extent of 
new pollution will not be evident.665 Simplot may be “long gone” when 
the destructive consequences of its operation are realized.666 The dis-
sent submitted that “[t]he majority’s w
and incomplete assessments of the agencies in this case amounts to an 
abdication of the judicial function.”667 
 In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled on environmental groups’ challenge to a land ex-
change in Arizona between the BLM and Asarco, a mining company.668 
The appellants contended the exchange violated NEPA, FLPMA, and 
the Mining Law of 1872.669 Asarco wanted an exchange of land ena-
bling it to mine without complying with the Mining Law of 1872, there-
by avoiding the need to prepare a Mining Plan of Operations (MPO) 
that would need to be approved by the BLM.670 The BLM prepared an 
EIS that assumed that the MPO process would not affect Asarco’s man-




s, 628 F.3d at 1158. 
 1701–1785 (2006). 
, 623 F.3d at 636. 
661 Id. 
662 Id. 
663 See id. at 115
664 Id. at 1156. 
665 Id. at 1158. 
666 Lewi
667 Id. 
668 623 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 2010). 
669 Id.; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2006); 43 U.S.C. §§
670 Ctr. for Biological Diversity
671 Id. 
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u er the presumption that the mining operations would be the same 
whether or not the land was federally owned.
nd
cessary for an 
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 The Ninth Circuit held that the BLM had not taken a hard look at 
the environmental impact of its proposed action, and therefore its ac-
tions concerning the EIS were arbitrary and capricious.673 The site al-
ready is the third most productive copper mine in the United States, but 
Asarco continued to seek more land (10,976 acres) in order to expand 
its operations.674 The land selected by Asarco provides important plant 
and wildlife habitat, including habitat for endangered species.675 Addi-
tionally, the land has archaeological sites eligible for nomination to the 
National Register of Historic Places, and some of the land is adjacent or 
in close proximity to the White Canyon Area of Critical Environmental 
Concern.676 The EIS recognized that the mining operation would have 
serious environmental impacts.677 The land to be acquired by the gov-
ernment would also have wildlife habitat values, but would be subject to 
mining claims even though most of the land would have only a “moder-
ate potential for locatable mineral resources.”678 In response, the EPA 
published thirteen pages of single-spaced comments strongly opposing 
the proposed land exchange.679 The EPA stated that reasonable alterna-
tives were not evaluated and the detailed information ne
analysis was not provided,680 and therefore rated the “DEIS as EO-2— 
Environmental Objections-Insufficient Information.”681 
 The BLM repeatedly stated that mining was the foreseeable use 
under all alternatives and the environmental impacts would occur with 
or without MPO requirements.682 The FEIS also contained no analysis 
of the environmental impacts of a “No Action” alternative.683 The EPA, 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Sierra Club raised objections that 





674 Id. at 637. 
675 Id. 
676 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 623 F.3d at 637. 
677 See id. at 637–38. 
678 Id. at 638. 
679 Id. 
680 Id. at 638–39. 
681 Id. at 639. 
682 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 623 F.3d at 639–40. 
683 Id. at 640. 
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cord of Decision (ROD) that changed existing Resource Management 
Plans (RMPs) to remove the protective designation of the White Can-
yon Resource Conservation Area, which would remove the need to 
manage the lands under FLPMA.685 The appellants appealed to the 
Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), which denied relief.686 The 
str
mining operations with and without the requirement that MPOs be 
prepared by Asarco and approved by the BLM . . . .”694 The Ninth Cir-
                                                                                                                     
di ict court granted summary judgment to Asarco and the BLM on 
June 6, 2007.687 
 The environmental groups appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which 
held “that the BLM’s assumption that mining would occur on the se-
lected lands in the same manner regardless of the land exchange was 
arbitrary and capricious, and a violation of NEPA.”688 In addition, the 
BLM’s acceptance of the ROD’s assumption in concluding that the ex-
change was in the public interest was arbitrary and capricious, and 
therefore violated FLPMA.689 Moreover, the “BLM’s assumption in the 
FEIS that the environmental consequences of the land exchange alter-
native and the no action alternative would be the same was arbitrary and 
capricious.”690 But if the selected lands remain in public ownership, 
Asarco’s mining operations would be subject to the Mining Law of 1872, 
including the MPO requirements that provide significant regulatory 
control over the mining operation, and require consultation with other 
agencies pursuant to the NHPA and the ESA.691 The MPO process also 
mandates compliance with NEPA and FLPMA’s proscription of unnec-
essary or undue degradation, which is distinct from requirements under 
NEPA.692 Finally, MPO compliance can require satisfaction of state envi-
ronmental protection laws.693 Therefore, “the BLM must make a mean-
ingful comparison of the environmental consequences of Asarco’s likely 
 
 
685 Id. at 640–41. 
686 Id. at 641. 
687 Id. 
688 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 623 F.3d at 641–42. 
689 Id. at 642. 
690 Id. 
691 See id. at 642–45 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(a)(3)(iii) (2011)). The National His-
toric Preservation Act is located at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470A–470X-6 (2006). The ESA is located at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
692 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 623 F.3d at 644 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)). 
693 See id. 
694 Id. at 646. 
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cuit then reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the 
case.695 
 In the Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy, environmental organi-
zations challenged the grant of an easement for a road across the feder-
ally-owned Rocky Flats, a location previously used to process plutonium 
and produce nuclear weapon triggers.696 The road would have made it 
possible for owners of the subsurface to mine sand and gravel.697 The 
DOE did not perform a NEPA review because it relied on the use of a 
categorical exclusion exempting transfers of property where the use of 
the property is unchanged and the impacts remain essentially un-
changed.698 The court held that “[t]here is no rational basis to conclude 
that constructing a private mining road on this land is the same land use 
as researching wind energy.”699 Moreover, when an action is proposed in 
connection with other actions with potentially significant impacts, the 
agency may not use a categorical exclusion.700 In this case, the DOE 
should have considered the mine expansion as well as the impacts of the 
changed use of the road in determining whether an EA or EIS was re-
quired under NEPA.701 The court concluded that the Agency abused its 
discretion when it declined to prepare an EA or EIS, and it failed to take 
a hard look at the mine and easement’s significant impact on the envi-
ronment.702 Therefore, the court directed the DOE to void the ease-
ment.703 
                                                                                                                      
 
695 Id. at 650. The case includes a dissent, which argues that the BLM’s actions were 
not arbitrary or capricious and posits that BLM should be allowed to manage public lands 
under FLPMA standards in light of Asarco’s substantial preexisting mining rights. Id. at 
650–66. 
696 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (D. Colo. 2002). 
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EIS Unnecessary for Oil Shale Development in Mountain West, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1069 (May 
13, 2011). In 2011, the Secretary of the Interior announced that it may be necessary to 
update oil shale plans in an effort to make about “1.9 million acres of public lands poten-
tially available for commercial oil shale development and 431,224 acres for tar sands leas-
ing and development.” Id. 
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IV. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Electric  
Power Development 
 Traditionally there have been a limited number of NEPA based 
claims against fossil-fueled electric power plants, however, the promi-
nence of climate change has brought more of these cases to the fore-
front.704 The D.C. Circuit Court explained why there are so few NEPA 
cases in National Committee for the New River v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.705 In this case, the court refused to require consideration of 
non-jurisdictional activities merely because they were connected to a 
pipeline.706 In upholding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
(FERC’s) decision not to evaluate the environmental impact of the 
electric power plant, the court said “[t]he Commission reasoned that 
not only would construction, operation, and location of the plant be 
regulated by the Commonwealth of Virginia, but the federal govern-
ment had no financial involvement in the project and no federal lands 
were at stake.”707 The applicability of NEPA in this realm is limited be-
cause federal regulation or direct federal financial support of fossil fuel 
electric power plants is minimal.708 
 In Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
D.C. Circuit ruled on challenges, including those based on NEPA, to the 
nuclear waste repository at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain.709 The case pri-
marily involved the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, as 
amended in 1987 and 1992, and its implementation by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).710 The Yucca Mountain site is subject to 
                                                                                                                      
 
704 See, e.g., Border Power Plant Working Group v. DOE, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 
2003); see infra notes 817–879 and accompanying text. 
705 See 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining the degree of deference given 
to agencies in drafting EISs). 
706 Id. at 1334. 
707 Id. 
708 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006) 
(stating NEPA’s applicability to federal actions); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011) (describing 
major federal actions). 
709 373 F.3d 1251, 1257, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
710 Id. at 1257, 1258, 1261; see Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 
106 Stat. 2778, 2921–23 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101–10,270); Nuclear 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 5001–5065, 101 Stat. 1330-
227 to -255; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983); 10 
C.F.R. §§ 60, 63, 963 (2011) (generic licensing standards, Yucca-specific licensing stan-
dards, and site-suitability criteria, respectively); 40 C.F.R. §§ 191, 197 (2011) (radiation 
release standards). 
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the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of 1992, which ex-
empts the site from EPA’s generally applicable environmental regula-
tions.711 Nevada, Clark County, and the City of Las Vegas brought the 
NEPA claims in the case.712 NWPA section 114(f)(4) provides that the 
Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) FEIS shall, to the extent practicable, 
be adopted by the NRC in connection with the issuance of a construc-
tion authorization and license for the Yucca Mountain repository.713 
Adopting DOE’s EIS satisfies NRC’s responsibilities under NEPA and 
“no further consideration shall be required.”714 This statutory provision, 
however, does not permit NRC to utilize an EIS that does not meet 
NEPA’s statutory and regulatory requirements.715 Also, DOE is expected 
to support one or more future decisions related to Yucca Mountain with 
its FEIS, including the selection of an alternative method of waste trans-
portation to the site.716 The D.C. Circuit then rejected the NEPA-based 
challenges, primarily on the grounds that they were not ripe.717 The 
statutory bar to NEPA review for the Yucca Mountain repository makes 
it unlikely that NEPA will play much of a role going forward.718 
A. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Alternative Energy Development 
 Interior has a significant management task to comply with its obli-
gations under NEPA and fulfill its renewable energy goal. These goals 
include increasing the megawatts of renewable energy production 
permitted on public lands.719 The Agency produced a PEIS for wind 
projects on western public lands.720 On December 17, 2010, the BLM 
and DOE published a joint draft PEIS regarding solar energy develop-
ment on public lands in six southwestern states—attempting to estab-
                                                                                                                      
 
711 Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act § 8, Pub. L. No. 102–579, 106 Stat. 4777, 4786–
88 (1992). 
712 Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3d at 1285. 
713 42 U.S.C. § 10,134(f)(4). 
714 Id. 
715 Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3d at 1314. 
716 Id. at 1312. 
717 See id. at 1313. 
718 See 42 U.S.C. § 10,134(f)(4) (2006); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3d at 1313–14. 
719 Andrew Childers, Interior Department Plans to Double Permits for Renewable Generation by 
End of 2011, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 796 (Apr. 15, 2011). 
720 Robert Miller & Miles Imwalle, Energy Independence Achievable with New Environmental 
Regulatory Approach, ABA Trends (Nov./Dec. 2009), at 5, 5. 
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lish 677,000 acres of solar zones in Arizona, California, Colorado, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, and Utah.721 Establishing solar zones would stream-
line and standardize the process for developing solar projects on 
214,000 acres of these lands.722 On October 25, 2010, Interior approved 
the Blythe Solar Power Project in California, which was the sixth solar 
energy project approved by the Department on public lands in the fall 
of 2010.723 On April 26, 2011, the BLM announced it was placing re-
newable energy development areas off-limits to mining claims for two 
years in order to provide time for an environmental review and a grant 
of a right-of-way for solar and wind projects.724 
 Six months later, Interior issued its first commercial lease to Cape 
Wind Associates, LLC for development of a wind farm on the Outer 
Continental Shelf.725 The wind farm will be located in Nantucket Sound 
off the coast of Massachusetts.726 In addition, the Department is seeking 
to grant one or more leases for a second wind project about twelve nau-
tical miles south of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.727 It plans to pre-
pare an EA and, if necessary, an EIS.728 On February 7, 2011, Interior 
announced the first of four Wind Energy Areas where permitting will be 
expedited—off the coasts of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vir-
ginia.729 The Department expects to identify additional wind energy 
sites for expedited development in areas off the coasts of Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and North Carolina.730 It also released a strategic plan for 
offshore wind energy development in 2011.731 
                                                                                                                      
 
721 75 Fed. Reg. 78,992 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
722 Ari Natter, Interior, Energy Departments Identify ‘Solar Energy Zones’ in Six Western States, 
41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2850 (Dec. 31, 2010). 
723 Ari Natter, Sixth Solar Project on Public Land to Gain Interior Approval Is Largest at 7,000 
Acres, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2408 (Oct. 29, 2010). 
724 Emilene Ostlind, BLM Shields Renewable Projects from Mining Speculation, High 
Country News (Paonia, Colo.) (May 30, 2011), available at http://www.hcn.org/issues/ 
43.9/blm-shields-renewable-projects-from-mining-speculation. 
725 Ari Natter, Interior Issues Request for Interest in Second Offshore Wind Farm Lease Area, 41 




729 Ari Natter, Leases for New Offshore Wind Projects Could Be Issued in 2011, Interior Says, 
42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 275 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
730 Id. 
731 Id. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Energy, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Cre-
ating an Offshore Wind Energy Industry in the United States (2011), available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/national_offshore_wind_strategy.pdf. 
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 In Western Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Management, the dis-
trict court denied a request for a preliminary injunction to stop a 150-
megawatt wind-generating facility utilizing seventy-five wind turbines.732 
The court ruled the BLM had considered all relevant factors in its EA.733 
After finding no significant impact and requiring no important mitiga-
tion measures, BLM was not required to produce an EIS.734 In Pit River 
Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, the Forest Service produced an EIS for a geo-
thermal development project.735 The Forest Service did not discuss the 
no-action alternative, which resulted in the Ninth Circuit determining 
that the EIS did not meet NEPA’s requirement to take a hard look at the 
no-action alternative including total abandonment of the project.736 
B. NEPA-Based Litigation Concerning Transmission Lines 
 Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion is a consolidated case where two community organizations and two 
state agencies challenged FERC regulations implementing portions of 
the Federal Power Act.737 The Fourth Circuit clarified that NEPA ap-
plies to every proposed transmission project subject to FERC jurisdic-
tion and also requires a PEIS when federal actions are connected or 
cumulative.738 Petitioners challenged the regulations concerning per-
mits for the modification or construction of electric transmission lines 
in areas designated as national interest corridors.739 Petitioners used 
both the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and NEPA as the basis for their 
claims.740 
 Petitioners were successful on some of the NEPA-based chal-
lenges,741 but lost on their claim that an EA or EIS was required be-
                                                                                                                      
 
732 W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091, 1104 
(D. Nev. 2011). 
733 Id. at 1100–01. 
734 Id. at 1101; William H. Carlile, Judge Lets Nevada Wind Project Proceed, Says BLM Con-
sidered All Relevant Factors, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 741 (Apr. 8, 2011). 
735 469 F.3d 768, 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2006). 
736 Id. at 772, 785. 
737 558 F.3d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 2009); see 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2006). The Federal 
Power Act provision was added in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 
Stat. 594. 
738 See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 316, 318. 
739 Id. at 309. 
740 Id. at 309–10. 
741 Id. at 319–20. 
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cause the court held that procedural rules do not require a full envi-
ronmental analysis.742 The court also held that the issuance of proce-
dural regulations specifying the content of permit applications does not 
require preparation of either an EA or an EIS.743 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court evaluated the claim that NEPA required a PEIS,744 
which is needed when one agency action triggers other actions.745 The 
court found that the issuance of the contested regulations was an inde-
pendent action, not part of a larger FERC action that required an 
EIS.746 Moreover, there were no cumulative actions with significant en-
vironmental effects because the issuance of regulations was not inter-
dependent with any other FERC action requiring an EIS.747 Petitioners 
also alleged that FERC’s revision of its NEPA-implementing regulations, 
before consulting with the CEQ, was a violation of CEQ regulations.748 
The court found for the petitioners and vacated FERC’s amended 
NEPA regulations.749 
 The DOE lost another NEPA case in California Wilderness v. U.S. 
Department of Energy.750 In this case, state and environmental petitioners 
challenged the DOE’s Congestion Study and designation of national 
interest electric transmission corridors (NIETCs) because the Depart-
ment failed to consult with the affected states as required by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct).751 The petitioners additionally claimed that 
the DOE neglected to undertake an environmental study for its NIETC 
designation as required by NEPA.752 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
DOE failed to properly consult with the affected states before it com-
pleted its study and failed to prepare an environmental analysis prior to 
                                                                                                                      
 
742 Id. at 310, 316, 320 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a)(2)(ii)). 
743 Id. at 310. 
744 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 316. 
745 Id. 
746 Id. at 317. 
747 Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2011). 
748 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 317–18; see 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a). FERC’s NEPA 
implementing regulations are found at 18 C.F.R. pt. 380. 
749 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 309–10, 320. 
750 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011). 
751 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006); California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1079. 
752 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 
California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1079. 
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designating NIETCs.753 The court vacated both the Congestion Study 
and NIETCs designation, remanding the matter to the DOE.754 
 The EPAct provides a federal permit approval process for a trans-
mission line within the NIETC.755 FERC may grant a permit for a power 
line within the national corridor if a state agency fails to approve a 
permit application within a year.756 The EPAct, however, specifically 
requires compliance with applicable federal environmental laws, in-
cluding NEPA.757 
                                                                                                                     
 The DOE issued its Congestion Study in August 2006, and issued a 
request for comments in a Federal Register notice.758 On May 7, 2007, 
the DOE responded to comments already submitted, and asked for ad-
ditional comments on two Critical Congestion Areas identified in the 
Congestion Study.759 In response to comments calling for a PEIS, the 
DOE claimed that NEPA did not apply because the designation of a 
NIETC is not a major federal action significantly affecting the human 
environment.760 
 In its review of the DOE’s actions, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the 
responses of the Department in relation to its statutory duty to consult 
with the affected states.761 The court noted that consultation meant 
more than providing notice and an opportunity to comment.762 The 
DOE did not distribute a draft to the affected states, create a committee 
consisting of representatives of those states, or provide those states with 
relevant data.763 The court stated that an agency has an affirmative duty 
to meet its consultation obligation,764 and “by failing to provide the af-
fected States with the modeling data on which it based the Congestion 
Study, the DOE prevented the affected States from providing informed 
 
 
753 California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1079. 
754 Id. 
755 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)–(h). 
756 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i). 
757 Id. § 824p(h)(6)(D). 
758 National Electric Transmission Congestion Study, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,047 (Aug. 8, 
2006). 
759 Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; Draft National Interest Electric 
Transmission Corridor Designations, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,838, 25,840 (May 7, 2007). 
760 Id. at 25,850–51. 
761 See California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1085–87. 
762 Id. at 1087. 
763 Id. at 1088. 
764 Id. (citing Confederated Tribe & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 
466, 475 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
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criticism and comments.”765 An agency has a duty to provide access to 
all technical studies and data it relied on to make a decision.766 Releas-
ing data after a study does not fulfill the duty to consult with the af-
fected states.767 The Ninth Circuit discussed Shinseki v. Sanders, where 
the Supreme Court noted that a party contesting an agency’s determi-
nation bears the burden of proving harmful error.768 The consultation 
requirement mandates an exchange of information before the agency 
makes a decision; failure to provide such an opportunity is not harm-
less error.769 
 The court also found that the DOE’s failure to prepare an EIS or 
an EA contemplating the environmental consequences of the NIETCs 
contravened NEPA.770 An agency may not avoid its NEPA obligations by 
simply stating that an action’s effect on the environment will be insig-
nificant.771 The DOE’s conclusory statement did not demonstrate to 
the court that it took a hard look at the possible effects on the envi-
ronment.772 The court concluded “the fact that the NIETCs do not ap-
prove the actual sitings of specific transmission facilities does not ex-
cuse the DOE from considering the NIETCs’ environmental 
impacts.”773 These NIETCs are major federal actions because they cover 
over 100 million acres in ten states and create new federal rights, in-
cluding the power of eminent domain, which curtails rights tradition-
ally held by state and local governments.774 
 The DOE argued that the NIETCs did not have substantial envi-
ronmental consequences because they did not approve actual sites.775 
The court, however, held that a decision to incentivize transmission fa-
cility siting in one municipality instead of another impacts both mu-
nicipalities because it affects the proposed and potential uses of land 
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766 Id. 
767 California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1089. 
768 Id. at 1091 (citing 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009)). 
769 Id. at 1090, 1093. 
770 Id. at 1096. 
771 Id. at 1097 (citing Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 859 
(9th Cir. 1999) and Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
772 Id. at 1098. 
773 California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1098. 
774 Id. at 1100–01 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b), (e) (2006) and Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. 
Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 668 (9th Cir. 1998) for the elements of major federal action). 
775 Id. at 1103. 
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and its value.776 The court explained that “[t]he effects may be difficult 
to measure and may be determined ultimately to be too imprecise to 
influence the Designation, but this is precisely the type of determina-
tion that can be intelligently made only after the preparation of at least 
an EA.”777 
 The DOE’s claim that it was not possible to consider the environ-
mental impacts of the NIETCs was undercut by its prior preparation of 
a PEIS before designating the West-wide Corridors for federal lands.778 
This PEIS demonstrates the feasibility of determining the environ-
mental impacts of a proposed energy corridor and that such a study 
may prompt modification of a corridor’s boundaries.779 The court ex-
plained the “DOE’s ability to undertake a PEIS for West-wide Corridors, 
and to modify the boundaries based on the PEIS, undermines its asser-
tion that it is not possible to evaluate the environmental impacts of a 
NIETC.”780 The court concluded that because the DOE deemed the 
smaller West-wide Corridors deserving of a PEIS, the NIETCs should 
also be evaluated in an EA or EIS.781 
 The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 encourages 
improving transmission line capacity in order to develop large-scale 
renewable energy projects.782 In December 2010, San Diego Gas & 
Electric commenced the construction of its 117-mile, 500-kilovolt 
transmission line known as the Sunrise Powerlink.783 The line is de-
signed to carry renewable energy from the Imperial Valley to San Die-
go, California.784 The line will traverse about forty-nine miles of BLM 




778 Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE/EIS-0386, Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement, Designation of Energy Corridors on Federal Land in the 11 
Western States (2007). 
779 California Wilderness, 631 F.3d at 1104. 
780 Id. at 1105. 
781 Id. 
782 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 
138–39. The Act required a study called the National Electric Congestion Transmission 
Report. Id. at 146. 
783 Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Record of Decision for the 
Sunrise Powerlink Transmission Project and Associated Amendment to the East-
ern San Diego County Resource Management Plan 5 (2008) [hereinafter Sunrise 
Powerlink Record of Decision]; Onell R. Soto, Governor Calls Sunrise Powerlink Example to 
Nation, U-T San Diego (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.citizensenergy.com/file/280/sunrise 
%20powerlink%20article.pdf. 
784 Sunrise Powerlink Record of Decision, supra note 783, at 3. 
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land and nineteen miles of National Forest land.785 A non-profit or-
ganization, Backcountry Against Dumps, challenged the Sunrise Power-
link project before Interior’s Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) based on 
alleged violations of NEPA, FLPMA, ESA, and the National Historic 
Preservation Act.786 The IBLA found that the petitioners failed to show 
the transmission line would be used by fossil-fueled generated electric 
power and rejected the challenge.787 The Forest Service approved the 
Sunrise Powerlink and issued a permit in December 2010.788 
V. Council on Environmental Quality Regulations Concerning 
Climate Change 
 On February 18, 2010, the CEQ released draft guidance concern-
ing the application of NEPA to climate change and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.789 The policies and procedures outlined in the draft 
guidance will only become effective when issued in final form.790 The 
draft guidance affirms the applicability of NEPA to GHG emissions and 
climate change, identifies applicable sections of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and urges federal agencies to mitigate adverse impacts 
through GHG emission reduction efforts and adaptation measures.791 
Specifically, the draft guidance requires agencies to both analyze the 
impacts of GHG emissions and climate change for proposed actions, 
and consider alternative actions including carbon capture and seques-
tration.792 The draft guidance recommends that agencies prepare 
quantitative and qualitative assessments when the direct annual release 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions is 25,000 metric tons per 
year (tpy) or more.793 Although this baseline does not apply for long-
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786 Backcountry Against Dumps, 179 IBLA 148, 160 (2010), available at http://www. oha. 
doi.gov/IBLA/ibladecisions/179IBLA/179IBLA148%20BACKCOUNTRY%20AGAINST%20 
DUMPS,%20ET%20AL.%205-14-2010.pdf (final administrative review). 
787 Id. at 168. 
788 Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FS-2700-4, Special Use Permit (2009), avail-
able at http://regarchive.sdge.com/sunrisepowerlink/docs/specialuse_permit-letter.pdf. 
789 Memorandum Issuing Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Cli-
mate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100218-nepa-consideration-effects-ghg-draft- 
guidance.pdf [hereinafter Draft NEPA Guidance]. 
790 See id. at 11. 
791 Id. at 1. 
792 Id. at 1, 6. 
793 Id. at 1, 3. 
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term actions with less than 25,000 tpy of CO2e emissions, the CEQ ad-
vises agencies to conduct similar assessments.794 Similarly, the EPA’s tai-
loring rule designates 75,000 tpy of CO2e emissions as the threshold at 
which new stationary sources must seek Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration (PSD) permits. Projects that do not require a permit may not 
need to comply with NEPA. 
 The NEPA analysis serves two principal goals. First, it can “reduce 
vulnerability to climate change impacts, adapt to changes in our envi-
ronment, and mitigate the impacts of Federal agency actions that are 
exacerbated by climate change.”795 Second, it can aid in achieving re-
ductions in GHG emissions through conservation of energy, reductions 
in energy use, and by promoting the use of renewable energy tech-
nologies.796 Additionally, it encourages quantification of cumulative 
emissions over the life of a project and actions to reduce GHG emis-
sions, including the consideration of reasonable alternatives.797 It is ex-
pected that an EIS, however, will be necessary for significant national 
policy decisions but not individual projects.798 The guidance also sug-
gests using techniques specified in the Mandatory Reporting of Green-
house Gases Final Rule to quantify GHG emissions.799 The guidance 
concludes that it is not creating a new component of NEPA analysis, but 
climate change is a “potentially important factor to be considered with-
in the existing NEPA framework.”800 
 This guidance is not necessarily applicable to federal land and re-
source management, but the CEQ “seeks public comment on the ap-
propriate means of assessing the GHG emissions and sequestration that 
are affected by federal land and resource management decisions.”801 
Although the draft guidance was issued in February 2010, it was not 
finalized as of April 2012.802 




794 Id. at 1; see 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(48)(b)(iv) (2011). Permits for sources in attain-
ment areas and for other pollutants regulated under the major source program are re-
ferred to as PSD permits. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(48)(b)(iv). 
795 Draft NEPA Guidance, supra note 789, at 2. 
796 Id. at 5. 
797 Id. 
798 Id. at 3. 
799 Id. at 3–4 (referencing Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 
56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009)). 
800 Id. at 11. 
801 Draft NEPA Guidance, supra note 789, at 11. 
802 Avery Fellow, Federal Agencies Vary Greatly in Considering Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Projects, 43 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 130 ( Jan. 20, 2012); see Council on Envtl. Quality, Draft 
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 In addition to NEPA obligations, federal agencies must comply 
with applicable executive orders. In Executive Order 13,514, President 
Obama declared “that Federal Agencies shall increase energy effi-
ciency; measure, report, and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
from direct and indirect activities.”803 To implement this policy, a “Stra-
tegic Sustainability Performance Plan” must include GHG reduction 
targets.804 The Order requires agency heads to report their agency-wide 
GHG emission reduction targets, but does not explicitly mandate car-
bon sequestration.805 It also requires the creation of targets for GHG 
emissions from sources controlled by a federal agency, as well as GHG 
emissions from the generation of electricity purchased by a federal 
agency.806 On January 29, 2010, President Obama announced that the 
federal government will reduce its GHG emissions by twenty-eight per-
cent by 2020.807 The federal target is based on the aggregate of thirty-
five federal agencies’ self-reported targets.808 
 Section 16 of the Executive Order requires the Interagency Cli-
mate Change Adaptation Task Force to develop recommendations to 
guide federal agencies in developing climate adaptation plans.809 The 
Task Force provided its recommendations to the CEQ,810 which the 
CEQ later adopted and, as a result, issued instructions on how to im-
plement those plans as well as target dates for stages of implementa-
tion.811 By April 15, 2011, each federal agency was to identify a “senior 




Guidance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change Impacts, WhiteHouse.Gov (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
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804 Id. 
805 Id. 
806 Id. at 52,117, 52,126. 
807 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Sets Greenhouse Gas 




809 Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,124–25. 
810 Council on Envtl. Quality, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate 
Change Adaptation Task Force: Recommended Actions in Support of a National 
Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report. 
pdf. 
811 Council on Envtl. Quality, Federal Agency Climate Change Adaptation Plan-
ning: Implementing Instructions 2–3 (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www. white-
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agency official responsible for carrying out climate change adaptation 
planning actions.”812 By June 3, 2011, each agency was to make publicly 
available a climate change adaptation policy statement that describes 
how the agency will coordinate its adaptation planning implementation 
process and designate programs and resources within the agency that 
will support the planning process.813 By September 30, 2011, each 
agency was to submit to the CEQ a preliminary analysis of the agency’s 
vulnerability to climate change, and complete its analysis by March 
2012.814 By September 30, 2011, each agency was to submit to the CEQ 
“three to five priority climate change adaptation actions that the agency 
will implement in fiscal year 2012.”815 By June 4, 2012, each agency was 
to submit to the CEQ and to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) its climate adaptation plan for fiscal year 2013, which, after ap-
proval by OMB, will be made publicly available.816 
VI. NEPA Litigation Involving Climate Change Issues 
 Courts are increasingly using NEPA as a tool to force federal 
agencies to consider global climate change related to actions within 
the agency’s jurisdiction.817 Over the past decade, courts have decided 
several cases concerning whether consideration of climate change 
implications is a necessary part of NEPA analysis.818 Moreover, the 
CEQ has determined that reasonably foreseeable trans-boundary im-
pacts of proposed agency actions must be included in NEPA-based 
reviews.819 In Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy, 
the court held that an EA for a federal action contravened NEPA be-
cause it failed to disclose and analyze potential environmental impacts 




812 Id. at 3. 
813 Id. 
814 Id. at 4. 
815 Id. at 4–5. 
816 Id. at 5. 
817 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006). See generally C. Grady Moore, III et al., Indirect Im-
pacts and Climate Change: Assessing NEPA’s Reach, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Spring 2009, at 
30, 30 (providing an overview of the role of climate change in the EIS process). 
818 See infra notes 820–879 and accompanying text. 
819 Council on Envtl. Quality Guidance on NEPA Analysis for Transboundary 
Impacts 3 (1997), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/transguide.html. 
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incident to construction of a power line carrying electricity from new 
power plants in Mexico to Southern California.820 
 The first federal appellate decision to impose the need to consider 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the resulting air pollution in a 
NEPA case was Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation 
Board.821 In 2003, the Eighth Circuit held that the Surface Transporta-
tion Board (Board) did not fully comply with NEPA because it failed to 
consider potential increases in emissions resulting from the creation of 
a new rail line.822 The petitioners challenged the Board’s approval of a 
proposal to construct 280 miles of new rail line, and to improve 600 
miles of existing rail line in Minnesota and South Dakota for transport-
ing coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin.823 Petitioners were con-
cerned about the substantial increase in train traffic and the corre-
sponding increase in noise levels in the city of Rochester, Minnesota.824 
The Eighth Circuit conducted an extensive review of the NEPA meth-
odology and analysis of the environmental impacts and other effects of 
the related mitigation efforts on Rochester residents.825 
 The court next addressed the Sierra Club’s argument that the 
Board failed to consider the effects on air quality from an increase in 
the supply of low-sulfur coal.826 The Sierra Club argued there would be 
a significant increase in air pollutants, including carbon dioxide, that 
are not subject to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards limits 
that are applicable to other criteria pollutants such as sulfur dioxide.827 
The court reasoned that the direct and indirect environmental effects 
of a federal action causing degradation in air quality must be addressed 
in an EIS if the effect is reasonably foreseeable.828 The court found the 
Board “completely ignored” the effects of increased coal consumption 
and did not fulfill the requirements within the CEQ regulations.829 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
820 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
821 345 F.3d 520, 548–50 (8th Cir. 2003). 
822 Id. at 549–50. 
823 Id. at 532. 
824 Id. at 534–39. 
825 Id. at 533–50. 
826 Id. at 548. 
827 Mid States, 345 F.3d at 548. 
828 Id. at 549 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding 
that an effect is reasonably foreseeable when it is “sufficiently likely to occur that a person 
of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision”)). 
829 Id. at 550. 
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court held “it would be irresponsible for the Board to approve a project 
of this scope without first examining the effects that may occur as a re-
sult of the reasonably foreseeable increase in coal consumption.”830 
The court found “the Board did a highly commendable and profes-
sional job in evaluating an enormously complex proposal” but re-
manded the case to the Board.831 The Board then prepared a SEIS, 
which the Eighth Circuit found to be adequate.832 
                                                                                                                     
 In South Fork Band v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the Ninth Circuit 
expressed a view similar to that of the Eighth Circuit.833 The court held 
that indirect effects that impact air quality must be considered under 
NEPA.834 The CEQ “regulations define indirect effects as those ‘caused 
by the action, [and] later in time or further removed in distance, [but] 
still reasonably foreseeable.’”835 In addition, impacts must be evaluated 
because the Supreme Court recently decided that carbon dioxide 
should be considered an air pollutant under the CAA.836 
 In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, eleven states, the District of Columbia, and city and public 
interest organizations petitioned for review of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rule that imposed corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for light trucks.837 Commenta-
tors on the rule reported that about thirty-one percent of U.S. emis-
sions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are produced by the transportation sec-
tor, and overall, U.S. light-duty vehicles produce about five percent of 




831 Id. at 556. 
832 Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). 
833 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009). 
834 S. Fork Band, 588 F.3d at 725. 
835 Id. at 725 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2011)). 
836 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007). 
837 538 F.3d 1172, 1180–81 (2008) (citing Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light 
Trucks, Model Years 2008–2011, 49 C.F.R. § 533 (2011)). 
838 Id. at 1190. The NHTSA had imposed fuel economy standards for light trucks that 
were less stringent than the requirements imposed on cars. Id. at 1208. Consequently, 
manufacturers began producing sport utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks rather 
than large cars and station wagons that would be subject to more restrictive fuel economy 
standards. Id. As light trucks became more popular, the overall average fuel economy for 
the light-duty vehicle fleet declined from 25.9 miles per gallon (MPG) in 1987 to 24.0 
MPG in 2000. Id. at 1184. In addition, vehicle miles traveled by light trucks increased at a 
faster pace than passenger automobile travel. Id. 
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 Petitioners challenged the CAFE rule, alleging violations of NEPA 
and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 based on the 
APA’s arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion standard.839 The 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case because of deficiencies in NHTSA’s 
compliance with both statutes.840 Additionally, the court reviewed 
NEPA’s requirements and found numerous failures in complying with 
the statute, including a failure to adequately assess the cumulative im-
pacts of GHG emissions on climate change and the environment.841 
 The Ninth Circuit held that the EA was “markedly deficient in its 
attempt to justify the refusal to prepare a complete EIS”842 and re-
manded the case to NHTSA to prepare either a revised EA or, if neces-
sary, an EIS.843 The court found the final rule arbitrary and capricious 
for a number of reasons, including NHTSA’s failure to monetize the 
value of carbon emissions.844 The court also noted that NHTSA—in its 
cost-benefit analysis— “excluded weight reduction for vehicles between 
4,000 and 5,000 lbs. curb weight as a potential measure that manufac-
turers could use to increase fuel economy.”845 It also failed to set a back-
stop that would prevent manufacturers from producing larger vehicles 
to avoid compliance with the stringent fuel economy standards.846 It 
failed to close the SUV loopholes created by a lack of fuel economy 
standards for all vehicles in the 8,500 to 10,000 gross vehicle weight rat-
ing class.847 
 Relying on precedent, the court noted that it must find that the 
Agency’s interpretation represented a “reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the stat-
ute.”848 The NHTSA had the “discretion to balance the oft-conflicting 
factors” within the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, but it 
could not set standards without adequately considering energy conser-
                                                                                                                      
 
839 Id. at 1181, 1193. 
840 Id. at 1181–82. 
841 Id. at 1215–17. 
842 Id. at 1220. 
843 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1182. 
844 Id. at 1181, 1198–1203. 
845 Id. at 1192. 
846 Id.at 1204–06. 
847 Id. at 1193, 1206–09. Medium-duty passenger vehicles manufactured during 2011 or 
thereafter were covered by the rule. Id. Vehicles with over a 10,000 pounds gross vehicle 
weight rating are not considered to be automobiles. Id. at 1183, 1193. 
848 Id. at 1195 (quoting Chevron v. NRDC 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)); see also Ctr. for 
Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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vation.849 The court was also critical of the EA’s cumulative analysis be-
cause the new CAFE standards did not consider the effects of emissions 
on climate change, nor would the standards offset the emissions from 
an increase in the number of light trucks on the road.850 The cumula-
tive impacts regulation requires the agency to review the current action 
in conjunction with “other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future [government] actions.”851 Moreover, the court reasoned that 
“[t]he impact of [GHG] emissions on climate change is precisely the 
kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to con-
uct
om agency projects will have a sig-
fic
                                                                                                                     
d .”852 
 The court next discussed the circumstances where the preparation 
of an EIS or new EA is required.853 When a court determines that an 
agency did not prepare an adequate initial EA, it will not necessarily 
require the preparation of an EIS on remand.854 For instance, when a 
court is not capable of determining whether a project will have a sig-
nificant environmental impact, it may remand for a new EA.855 Like-
wise, if an agency does not prepare an EA prior to its determination 
that a proposed action will have no significant impact, the court may 
remand for preparation of an EA.856 In addition, if an agency does not 
make its determination based on a complete record, a court may re-
mand for the creation of a new EA on a complete record.857 If a court 
determines that an agency’s “proffered reasons for its FONSI are arbi-
trary and capricious,” however, a court may remand for a full EIS.858 
This case illustrates that the NEPA review process must be used to de-
termine whether GHG emissions fr
ni ant impact on climate change. 
 In 2005, Interior expanded the leasing areas within the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) for offshore oil and gas development.859 In 
 
 
849 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1197. 
850 Id. at 1216. 
851 Id. at 1217 (citing CEQ Terminology & Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2007)). 
852 Id. 
853 Id. at 1225. 
854 Id. 




859 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 471 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
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Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior, petitioners 
challenged the approval of Interior’s leasing program for the waters off 
Alaska’s coast.860 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the petitioners’ challenges 
rising from the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) were jus-
ticiable, but the NEPA-based and ESA claims were not ripe for review.861 
Petitioners claimed that Interior violated both OSCLA and NEPA be-
cause it “failed to consider both the economic and environmental costs 
of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the Program and the 
effects of climate change on OCS areas.”862 The court held that the pe-
titioners lacked standing to pursue their substantive climate change 
theory, but they did have standing to bring their climate change claims 
nd
ing requirements.869 The NEPA-based claims, however, were not ripe 
                                                                                                                     
u er a procedural theory of standing.863 
 The court, in denying a substantive right to standing, distinguished 
Massachusetts v. EPA by finding that it was limited to a sovereign (Massa-
chusetts) suing to protect its own interests.864 The D.C. Circuit found 
that petitioners’ substantive theory that climate change in the Arctic 
environment may occur as a result of Interior’s leasing program did not 
meet the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing analysis.865 
The court found that the claimed injury was insufficient because it was 
not actual or imminent as required by the law of standing.866 In addi-
tion, because “climate change is a harm that is shared by humanity at 
large . . . [p]etitioners’ alleged injury is too generalized to establish 
standing.”867 Thus, the court did allow the case to move forward on the 
petitioners’ claims that Interior did not adhere to the procedural re-
quirements of OSCLA and NEPA, which were both “designed to pro-
tect some threatened concrete interest.”868 The organizations had a 
demonstrated interest in Alaskan wildlife, meeting the Article III stand-
 
 
860 Id. at 471–72. 
861 Id. at 472. In Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit allowed 
claims based on the ESA to go forward, but held that an EIS was not required. 588 F.3d 
701, 708–09, 712 (9th Cir. 2009). 
862 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d at 475. 
863 Id. at 479. 
864 Id. at 476–77 (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497). 
865 Id. at 478. 
866 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
867Id. 
868 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d at 476 (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 573 n.8). 
869 Id. at 479. 
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because the obligation to comply with NEPA cannot arise until the 
agency issues the leases.870 
 The first state agency to reject a coal-fired power plant permit ap-
plication due to concerns about GHG emissions involved the Sunflower 
Electric Power Corporation in Kansas.871 The Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment approved the permit just days before EPA’s 
GHG permit rules became effective in early 2011.872 The district court 
ruled that the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service’s in-
volvement in the project qualified as a major federal action subject to 
NEPA.873 The time necessary to prepare the NEPA-based response 
could require the project to be subject to the EPA’s new GHG permit 
rules.874 
 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, two environmental organi-
zations and several cities sued the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-
Im) claiming that those organizations did not conduct the necessary 
NEPA-based reviews.875 The plaintiffs argued that NEPA should apply 
to OPIC and Ex-Im-backed projects overseas because funding qualified 
as a major federal action that contributed to the degradation of the 
domestic environment due to global warming.876 The district court de-
nied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and allowed the 
case to proceed.877 
                                                                                                                     
 After the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
White House announced that the CEQ and Interior would review the 
Mineral Management Service’s (MMS) NEPA procedures.878 Such a 
 
 
870 Id. at 482. 
871 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 Wm. & Mary 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 821, 844; NEPA Ruling Opens Door to Subjecting Kansas Plant to EPA’s 
GHG Rules, 22 Clean Air Rep (Inside Wash. Publishers) (Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter NEPA 
Ruling Opens Door]. 
872 NEPA Ruling Opens Door, supra note 871. 
873 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 777 F. Supp. 2d 44, 68 (D.D.C. 2011). 
874 NEPA Ruling Opens Door, supra note 871. 
875 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 891–92 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
876Id. at 892. 
877 Id. at 920. 
878 See Press Release, Council on Environmental Quality and Department of the Inte-
rior Announce Review of Minerals Management Service NEPA Procedures (May 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/Press_Releases/May_14_ 
2010 [hereinafter MMS NEPA Procedures Press Release]; Lynn Garner, Obama Orders Re-
view of NEPA Policy; BP Exploration Plan Minimized Spill Impacts, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1155 
(May 21, 2010). 
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review could impact other Interior leasing programs, including its car-
bon capture and sequestration leasing efforts. In February 2010, the 
CEQ proposed to reinvigorate NEPA to deal with climate change.879 
Federal agencies, such as the DOE, should consider project alternatives 
including on-site carbon sequestration potential, alternative gasification 
technologies, renewable or efficiency-related projects, and mandated 
carbon capture and sequestration. 
VII. The Department of Energy’s NEPA Regulations 
 NEPA requires all federal agencies to review their statutory author-
ity, administrative regulations, procedures, and policies to determine if 
they need to address environmental deficiencies.880 The CEQ provides 
guidance for how agencies can adopt procedures to comply with 
NEPA.881 The DOE promulgated regulations to implement NEPA’s re-
quirements.882 
 Subpart A of the DOE regulations covers the general applicability 
of NEPA to the DOE.883 DOE regulations supplement the CEQ regula-
tions884—for example, the regulations provide additional definitions to 
the CEQ regulations.885 The DOE’s General Counsel must oversee 
NEPA compliance.886 
 Subpart B, which guides the DOE’s planning for NEPA compli-
ance, largely follows the CEQ regulations.887 The DOE regulations cov-
er the level of review required for a project or action,888 including re-
search and development activities, rulemaking, adjudicatory 
proceedings, applications for permits and licenses, and government 
procurement and financial assistance.889 
                                                                                                                      
 
879 MMS NEPA Procedures Press Release, supra note 878. 
880 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2006). 
881 CEQ Purpose, Policy, & Mandate, 10 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (2011); CEQ Agency Compli-
ance, 10 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (2010). 
882 NEPA Implementing Procedures, 10 C.F.R. § 1021.100 (2011). 
883 Id. § 1021.102(a). NEPA applies to the entire DOE with the exception of the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission. Id. 
884 Id. § 1021.100. 
885 Id. § 1021.104(b). 
886 Id. § 1021.105. 
887 Id. § 1021.200. 
888 10 C.F.R. § 1021.200(c). 
889 Id. §§ 1021.212–.216. 
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 Subpart C regulates the procedures that implement NEPA.890 It 
dictates how the DOE should handle the preparation of EISs and EAs, 
and when categorical exclusions apply.891 Subpart C includes the proc-
ess for public review of an EIS.892 Thirty days must pass after the release 
of a FEIS before the DOE decides on a proposal covered in the EIS.893 
The DOE must first publish a Record of Decision (ROD) in the Federal 
Register before it takes action on an EIS proposal.894 Subpart C also 
covers the use of an EA, a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), a 
programmatic EA or EIS, and mitigation action plans.895 
 Subpart D discusses the actions typically addressed by the DOE 
and the level of review for each action.896 Appendix A of this section 
identifies categorical exclusions applicable to general agency actions 
and Appendix B identifies the categorical exclusions applicable to spe-
cific agency actions.897 Categorical exclusions must not violate applica-
ble laws or adversely affect environmentally sensitive resources.898 Ap-
pendix C covers classes of actions that normally require an EA but not 
necessarily an EIS.899 Lastly, Appendix D deals with classes of actions 
that usually require an EIS.900 
 Federal agencies must comply with NEPA when funding or oversee-
ing projects and programs producing substantial carbon dioxide equiva-
lent emissions.901 NEPA compliance is required if the federal funding 
involves significant federal control or influence over the use of funds.902 
Consequently, if the DOE partly “finance[s], assist[s], conduct[s], regu-
late[s], or approve[s]” a project, it must comply with NEPA.903 
                                                                                                                      
 
890 Id. § 1021.300. 
891 Id. §§ 1021.300–.311. 
892 Id. § 1021.313. 
893 Id. § 1021.315(a). 
894 10 C.F.R. § 1021.315(b)–(d). 
895 Id. §§ 1021.321–.331. 
896 Id. § 1021.400. 
897 Id. § 1021, subpt. D, apps. A, B. 
898 Id. § 1021, subpt. D, app. B.B(4). 
899 Id. § 1021, subpt. D, app. C. 
900 10 C.F.R. § 1021, subpt. D, app. A (2011). 
901 See CEQ Terminology & Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2011). 
902 Id. 
903 Id. 
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  In January 2011, the DOE proposed to exclude twenty new indus-
trial activities from NEPA compliance review.904 The DOE also proposed 
removing two exclusion categories, one EA and two EIS categories.905 
The proposed modifications would account for innovations in energy 
efficient and renewable energy technology.906 Additionally, the DOE 
proposed omitting categorical exclusions for main transmission system 
additions and modifying the treatment of transmission line projects.907 
 The Department also proposed revisions to its implementing pro-
cedures given its growth and development over time.908 For example, 
the DOE received many financial assistance applications for energy in-
dependence and energy efficiency projects from private parties when 
federal legislation—including the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the En-
ergy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—created grant and loan pro-
grams.909 Moreover, many of these proposed actions would be located 
on private property or land managed by other agencies, rather than on 
its own sites.910 Eliminating allusions to “DOE site,” “onsite,” or “em-
ployee” from its NEPA rule would better align the regulations to the 
increased activities.911 Other suggested modifications explicated the 
DOE’s existing regulatory provisions.912 
 The Department set forth several revisions to the regulations about 
the application of categorical exclusions.913 It proposed removing the 
reference to section 102(2)(E)of NEPA to clarify it would not analyze 
alternatives in an EA for unresolved conflicts concerning alternative 
uses of available resources.914 Additionally, the DOE recommended 
                                                                                                                      
 
904 NEPA Implementing Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 214, 215 ( Jan. 3, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 10 C.F.R. pt. 1021). Among the new potential exclusions are experimental wells for 
injection of small quantities of carbon dioxide, combined heat and power or cogeneration 
systems, small-scale renewable energy research, development, and pilot projects, solar pho-
tovoltaic systems, solar thermal systems, wind turbines, ground source heat pumps, bio-
mass power plants, methane gas recovery and utilization systems, stations, drop-in hydroe-
lectric systems, and small-scale renewable energy research and development. Id. 
905 Id. at 216. 
906 Id. at 215. 
907 Id. at 234. 
908 Id. at 214–15. 
909 Id. at 218. 
910 76 Fed. Reg. at 218. 
911 Id. 
912 Id. at 236. 
913 Id. at 219. 
914 Id. 
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specifically referencing “the requirement that a categorically exclud-
able project has not been segmented.”915 Likewise, modifying refer-
ences to the CEQ requlations could better explain consideration of po-
tential cumulative impacts.916 It also advised including examples of 
activities foreseeably necessary to implement proposals that the CEQ’s 
class of actions comprise, such as purchase and installation of equip-
ment, and site preparation.917 Lastly, the DOE recommended codifying 
its Internet policy and electronically publishing categorical exclusion 
decisions.918 
 The Department also sought to revise regulations of categorical 
exclusions for specific site characterization, monitoring, and general 
research in several ways.919 For example, the regulations should limit 
categorical exclusions to actions with no potential to cause substantial 
effects from ground disturbance.920 The DOE also suggested excluding 
large-scale reflection or refraction testing with regard to seismic tech-
niques from the list of categorical exclusions.921 However, geological, 
geophysical, and geochemical surveying and mapping, and seismic sur-
veying as actions would remain qualified for a categorical exclusion.922 
Temperature gradient surveying could provide an example of a geo-
physical surveying activity within the scope of the categorical exclu-
sion.923 The DOE additionally advised expanding the categorical exclu-
sion list to include underground reservoir response testing—potential 
impacts of aquifer and reservoir response testing are widely understood 
and usually nominal—and it could help determine if the reservoir 
should be examined for carbon sequestration purposes.924 Finally, mi-
nor drilling projects, such as drilling using mobile-scale equipment and 
modification or use and plugging of boreholes, should be categorical 
exclusions because these activities cannot cause substantial environ-
mental impacts.925 
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 The DOE recommended expanding the breadth of the categorical 
exclusion by listing resources for which exploratory or experimental 
wells may be drilled including brine, carbon dioxide, coalbed methane, 
and gas hydrate.926 Similarly, the Department suggested noting proper 
uses for carbon sequestration wells, such as the study of saline forma-
tions, enhanced oil recovery, and enhanced coalbed methane extrac-
tion.927 The DOE urged designating fields with properly abandoned 
wells or unminable coal seams as locations where infill wells may be 
drilled.928 
 To encourage development in biomass and biofuel production, 
the regulations should clarify the existing categorical exclusion for 
small-scale research projects covering “small test plots for energy-
related biomass or biofuels research.”929 Terrestrial environment re-
search need not receive an additional exclusion because the Depart-
ment of Agriculture analyzes the environmental impacts of the experi-
mental and commercial growth of genetically-engineered plants and 
biotechnology crops as part of its regulatory scheme.930 
 The existing categorical exclusion should be broadened for dem-
onstration actions under its Clean Coal Technology Demonstration 
Program to encompass initiatives to reduce waste and emissions at al-
ternative fuel and fossil fuel facilities.931 Specifically, DOE advised re-
placing the term “coal” with “fuel” throughout the categorical exclu-
sion and defining fuel as “coal, oil, natural gas, hydrogen, syngas 
[synthesis gas], and biomass.”932 Projects demonstrating ways to reduce 
emissions and waste generation at existing alternative or fossil fuel fa-
cilities are unlikely to have significant environmental impacts.933 In ad-
dition, test treatment of throughput products generated at fuel com-
bustion should not be subject to a twenty percent limitation because of 
the importance of test treatment of the entire throughput product 
                                                                                                                      
 
926 Id. at 225. 
927 Id. 
928 76 Fed. Reg. at 225. Currently, infill wells may only be drilled in fields with operat-




932 Id. The DOE explicitly recommended excluding nuclear fuels from the definition 
of fuel. Id. 
933 Id. 
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stream for confirming the marketability of technologies.934 In addition, 
the Department suggested including “the addition or modification of 
equipment for capture and control of carbon dioxide or other regu-
lated substances” in the list of categorical exclusions because such 
processes cannot cause substantial impacts.935 
 The DOE also proposed a new categorical exclusion for research 
projects in aquatic environments.936 The categorical exclusion would 
permit “small-scale, temporary surveying, site characterization, and re-
search actions” in both fresh and saltwater environments. However, the 
proposed exclusion should only apply to: 
the acquisition of rights-of-way, easements, and temporary use 
permits; data collection, environmental monitoring, and non-
destructive research programs; resource evaluation activities; 
collection of various types of data and samples; installation of 
monitoring and recording devices; installation of equipment 
for flow testing of existing wells; and ecological and environ-
mental research in a small area.937 
The categorical exclusion would not apply to building or installing 
permanent facilities or devices, or drilling resource exploration or ex-
traction wells.938 Likewise, the Department recommended adjustments 
to the categorical exclusions pertaining to power resources.939 The 
DOE proposed using the word “interconnection” instead of “integra-
tion” where its exclusions refer to electric power generation from 
sources such as wind farms.940 
 Currently. “previously developed or disturbed transmission line 
rights-of-way” are categorically excluded as locations where actions can 
occur. The DOE suggested adding pipeline rights-of-way to this list be-
cause the environmental effects of siting, constructing, operating, or 
decommissioning actions in transmission line and pipeline rights of 
way are alike.941 Moreover, electric power contracts, policies and plans 
                                                                                                                      
 
934 76 Fed. Reg. at 225. Historically, such testing does not cause significant impacts. Id. 
935 Id. at 225–26. 
936 Id. at 226. 
937 Id. 
938 Id. 
939 Id. at 227. 
940 76 Fed. Reg. at 227. 
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not involving a new generation source, and modifications in the usual 
operating limits of current generation resources would remain cate-
gorically excluded.942 Removing substation actions, such as construct-
ing, upgrading, or rebuilding transmission lines, from the list of cate-
gorical exclusions was also proposed because such projects do not 
always entail transmission line actions.943 The regulations should not 
cap facilities’ voltage because voltage of a substation or interconnection 
facility is irrelevant to the environmental impact.944 
 The DOE advised expanding the categorical exclusion for modifi-
cations to pumps and piping by listing materials that could be conveyed 
by pumps and piping, such as air, brine, carbon dioxide, produced wa-
ter, steam, and water instead of restricting the exclusion to oil, gas, and 
geothermal facilities.945 Modifying pump and piping configurations for 
any of the listed materials does not cause significant impacts.946 
 Likewise, the Department recommended broadening the cate-
gorical exclusion for oil, brine, geothermal, and gas storage and injec-
tion wells by including carbon dioxide, coalbed methane, and gas hy-
drate wells in the exclusion.947 Modifying, plugging, or abandoning 
such wells does not have the potential to cause substantial environ-
mental impacts.948 Additionally, the regulations could expand the cate-
gorical exclusion for the repair or replacement of pipelines by adding 
materials akin to those currently listed (oil, produced water, brine, and 
geothermal water), such as air, carbon dioxide, hydrogen gas, natural 
gas, nitrogen gas, steam, and water.949 The DOE suggested extending 
the categorical exclusion for work on existing wells by adding brine, 
carbon dioxide, coalbed methane, and gas hydrate wells to the existing 
list of wells that may be repaired or replaced.950 Only situations with a 
low possibility of seismicity, subsidence, and contamination of freshwa-
ter aquifers as part of projects otherwise complying with “best practices 
and DOE protocols” should receive a categorical exclusion.951 
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943 Id. at 228. 
944 Id. 
945 Id. at 228. 




950 Id. at 229. 
951 Id. at 228, 229. 
2012] NEPA & Resource Development in the Western United States 381 
 The DOE proposed a new categorical exclusion for “experimental 
wells for the injection of small quantities of carbon dioxide in locally 
characterized geologically secure storage formations at or near existing 
carbon dioxide sources.”952 The exclusion will help determine the suit-
ability of geological formations for large-scale sequestration because 
small-scale projects are often accurate predictors of the environmental 
impacts of commercial-scale projects.953 Research projects spearheaded 
by the DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory support this ex-
clusion because small-scale carbon sequestration projects can be con-
ducted safely and with few environmental impacts.954 FONSIs issued for 
three Department EAs for projects with scales ranging up to one mil-
lion tons of carbon dioxide over the lifetime of the project—typically 
one to four years—further support creating a new exclusion.955 The 
DOE recommended limiting the injection of carbon dioxide under this 
exclusion to less than 500,000 tons over the duration of a project.956 
 Creation of a categorical exclusion for the conversion to, and re-
placement or modification of, combined heat and power or cogenera-
tion systems at existing facilities was proposed—assuming the action 
does not have the potential to cause a significant impact to water re-
sources or significant increases in the quantity or rate of air emis-
sions.957 These two conditions are likely satisfied in most cases for two 
reasons.958 First, most modifications will involve minor construction, 
and thus changes to facility footprints will be minimal; second, modifi-
cations will improve operating efficiency and thus will reduce the envi-
ronmental impact.959 
                                                                                                                      
 




956 Id. at 230. Again, the DOE advised further limiting the exclusion by requiring that 
actions have a low potential for seismicity, subsidence, and contamination of freshwater 
aquifers. Id. 
957 Id. 
958 76 Fed. Reg. at 230. 
959 Id. The proposed regulation includes many other modifications, mostly minor, to 
DOE activities unrelated to fossil fuel. See generally id. at 214–34. 
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VIII. The Department of the Interior’s and the Bureau of Land 
Management’s NEPA Policies 
 Interior’s NEPA policy is found in its departmental manual.960 
Chapter eleven of the manual covers the BLM oversight of the NEPA 
process.961 Interior’s Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance 
(OEPC) updates its NEPA requirements through environmental state-
ment, review, and compliance memoranda that interpret the man-
ual.962 BLM incorporates the CEQ and Interior requirements into the 
BLM NEPA Handbook (BLM Handbook), which is the focus of this 
discussion.963 The BLM Handbook includes within its NEPA process an 
evaluation of whether a project complies with any applicable land use 
plan (LUP).964 If a project does not conform to the LUP it may be 
modified in order to conform, or the LUP may be modified to allow 
the proposed action.965 If neither of these approaches satisfies the LUP, 
the proposal must be abandoned.966 
                                                                                                                     
 The BLM Handbook recognizes that NEPA applies to proposals 
for use or development of resources on lands administered by BLM.967 
Therefore, proposals for projects funded by BLM or located on lands 
managed by BLM require NEPA analysis.968 Projects on land not man-
aged by BLM require NEPA compliance only if BLM exercises sufficient 
control over the action such that the effects can be evaluated.969 Like-
wise, proposals involving mineral estates where BLM manages the sur-
face and subsurface trigger NEPA analysis.970 When BLM manages the 
subsurface and another federal agency manages the surface, NEPA ap-
plies but BLM must establish a cooperative agency relationship with the 
 
 
960 See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Dep’t Manual, pt. 516 National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (2009), available at http://elips.doi.gov/elips/browse.aspx (follow 
“Department Manual” folder hyperlink, then follow “Series 31” hyperlink, then follow 
“Part 516” hyperlink). 
961 Id. ch. 11. 
962 See generally id. ch. 1. 
963 Bureau of Land Mgmt, H-1790-1, National Environmental Policy Act Hand-
book, at TC-ix (2008) [hereinafter BLM Handbook]. 
964 Id. at 6. 
965 Id. 
966 Id. 
967 Id. at 15. 
968 Id. 
969 BLM Handbook, supra note 963, at 15. 
970 Id. at 16. 
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other federal agency.971 When BLM manages the subsurface but a non-
federal agency manages the surface estate, BLM must ensure NEPA 
compliance.972 Nevertheless, when BLM manages the surface and a 
non-federal entity manages the subsurface, NEPA analysis is prompted 
by a request for BLM to authorize surface disturbance.973 
 A categorical exclusion allows a federal action to comply with NEPA 
without obtaining an EA or an EIS.974 However, the action may need to 
meet other procedural requirements such as tribal consultation, or 
compliance with the ESA or the National Historic Preservation Act.975 
Some projects may be ineligible for a categorical exclusion because of 
extraordinary circumstances.976 Appendix five of the BLM Handbook 
lists twelve extraordinary circumstances, including actions with contro-
versial or unknown environmental effects, that mandate preparation of 
an EA or EIS.977 Categorical exclusions may be created by statute or by 
agency rules and regulations.978 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, for ex-
ample, provides a rebuttable presumption that specified activities involv-
ing oil and gas exploration and development activities are categorically 
excluded.979 Appendix four of the BLM Handbook lists categorical ex-
clusions under subject headings such as: (1) oil, gas, and geothermal 
energy; (2) realty; (3) solid minerals; and (4) transportation.980 
 The BLM Handbook encourages using existing environmental 
analyses, including work prepared by other agencies, and provides 
guidance on using such information.981 Prior to using an existing envi-
ronmental analysis, the BLM Handbook recommends reviewing rele-
vant documents, including EISs for BLM Resource Management Plans 
and EISs or EAs for BLM programmatic actions.982 The BLM Hand-
book advocates summarizing environmental analyses by incorporating 





974 Id. at 17. 
975 BLM Handbook, supra note 963, at 17. 
976 Id. at 19 (defining extraordinary circumstances as “circumstances for which the 
Department has determined that further environmental analysis is required for an ac-
tion”). 
977 Id. app. 5 at 155. 
978 Id. at 17–18. 
979 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15942(a) (2006)). 
980 Id. app. 4 at 147–53. 
981 BLM Handbook, supra note 963, at 21. 
982 Id. at 21–22. 
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by reference to summarize rather than repeating pertinent sections of 
existing environmental analyses.983 Similarly, it advises tiering to limit 
the extent of subsequent analysis.984 The BLM Handbook also provides 
guidance on supplementing an EIS.985 
 Chapter six of the BLM Handbook examines the NEPA analysis 
process.986 The material largely follows CEQ regulations, but explains 
terms such as “issues” in greater detail.987 Additionally, the BLM Hand-
book provides specific guidance on describing a proposed action and 
discussing connected and cumulative actions.988 It covers the develop-
ment of alternatives, including the no action alternative.989 The BLM 
Handbook also identifies and explains the standards of the “hard look” 
test for analyzing the effects of a proposal.990 
 Chapter seven explains how to determine whether an EA or an EIS 
is appropriate.991 It explains that the standard rule requires the prepa-
ration of an EA unless the actions are categorically excluded.992 If the 
EA concludes the action will have no significant effects, a finding of no 
significant impact should be drafted.993 If, however, the action will have 
a substantial impact, an EIS is required.994 The BLM Handbook fur-
nishes a list of actions that normally require an EIS, such as coal-lease 
sales, siting of industrial facilities, rights-of-way for major highways and 
railroads, and mining operations that disturb 640 acres or more.995 
Chapters eight and nine explain the procedures for preparing EAs and 
EISs.996 The final chapters of the BLM Handbook discuss monitoring 
requirements, agency review of an EIS, cooperating and joint-lead 
agencies and advisory committees, and administrative procedures.997 
                                                                                                                      
 
983 Id. at 25. 
984 Id. 
985 Id. at 29–31. 
986 Id. at 33–68. 
987 BLM Handbook, supra note 963, at 40. 
988 Id. at 43–49. 
989 Id. at 51. 
990 Id. at 55–56. 
991 Id. at 69. 
992 Id. 
993 BLM Handbook, supra note 963, at 70 (citing CEQ Terminology & Index, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.27 (2007)). 
994 Id. at 69. 
995 Id. at 70. 
996 Id. at 75, 87. 
997 Id. at 105, 109, 111, 117. 
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 On June 24, 2011, Interior (on behalf of the BLM, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service), the Department of 
Agriculture (on behalf of the Forest Service), and the EPA dissemi-
nated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning air quality 
analyses and mitigation for federal oil and gas decisions through 
NEPA.998 The MOU provides agencies with a common NEPA process 
for analyzing air quality impacts and air quality related values (AQRVs), 
such as visibility for onshore federal oil and gas planning, leasing, or 
field development.999 If a federal land management agency follows the 
best practices established by the MOU in its NEPA-based air quality and 
AQRVs analyses, the EPA will rate the analyses “adequate” and no fur-
ther NEPA-based procedure is required.1000 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of NEPA is to develop better information for federal 
agency decision-makers that will lead to better decisions.1001 NEPA gen-
erally accomplishes this goal, but at a substantial cost in time and mon-
ey.1002 A 2003 federal report estimated that a typical EIS required six 
years to complete at a cost of $250,000 to $2,000,000.1003 A typical EA 
required nine to eighteen months to prepare at a cost of $50,000 to 
$200,000.1004 Often, the applicant for a federal benefit pays these costs 
because the agencies shift the financial burden of compliance.1005 If 
NEPA compliance requires an analysis of climate change impacts, espe-
cially if the analysis includes dealing with indirect effects as well as cu-
mulative impacts, costs could increase substantially.1006 An issue to be 
considered is whether the increased costs and other challenges of 
NEPA compliance would produce information that results in better 
                                                                                                                      
 
998 Memorandum of Understanding Among the U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, & EPA, Regarding Air Quality Analyses & Mitigation for Federal Oil & Gas Deci-
sions Through the Nat’l Envtl Pol’y Act Process 1 ( June 24, 2011), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/air-quality-analyses-mou-2011.pdf. 
999 Id. 
1000 Id. at 2. 
1001 McAliley, supra note 298, at 10,197. 
1002 See id. at 10,198. 
1003 Id. (citing NEPA Task Force, Report to the CEQ, Modernizing NEPA Imple-
mentation ch. 6 (2003)). 
1004 Id. 
1005 Id. 
1006 See id. at 10,200. 
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decisions.1007 On December 7, 2011, the CEQ released draft guidance 
aimed at fostering efficiency and timeliness in the NEPA process, but it 
is unknown whether this will be effective in modifying how agencies 
approach their NEPA responsibilities.1008 
 Both DOE and Interior are vulnerable to NEPA-based attacks con-
cerning their energy development projects in the western United 
States.1009 It does not appear that either agency gives priority to full 
NEPA compliance.1010 Since 1990 federal agencies have usually filed 
approximately 450 to 600 EISs each year.1011 The EPA reports that over 
4200 EIS documents have been filed since 2004.1012 Annual FEIS doc-
ument production ranged from a low of 203 in 1989 to a high of 688 in 
1979, but since 2000 the number has ranged from 218 to 298 a year.1013 
 Since its first FEIS in 1977, the DOE has filed 294 FEISs.1014 Many 
of these EISs were prepared in partnership with other agencies, such as 
the EPA, the BLM, and more recently, the Department of State for the 
Keystone pipeline project.1015 From the year 2000 through 2007, the 
DOE’s EIS filings have fluctuated from a low of twenty in 2000 to a high 
of fifty-three in 2007.1016 EISs drafted by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) made up just over half of the total DOE EISs dur-
ing that time.1017 On average, Interior and its agencies file more EISs 
                                                                                                                      
 
1007 See McAliley, supra note 298, at 10,197. 
1008 Draft for Public Comment, Council on Envtl. Quality, Memorandum for Head of 
Federal Departments and Agencies: Improving the Process for Preparing Efficient and Time-
ly Environmental Reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/nepa_improving_efficien 
cy_draft_guidance.pdf. 
1009 See supra notes 789–816 and accompanying text. 
1010 See supra notes 789–816 and accompanying text. 
1011 See Council on Envtl. Quality, Environmental Impact Statements Filed 1973 
Through 2007, available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/EISs_by_Year_1970_2007.pdf. 
1012 All EISs Since 2004 (By Publication Date), Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://yosemite. 
epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/viEIS01?OpenView (last updated Apr. 16, 2012). 
1013 See Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 1011. 
1014 Dep’t of Energy, Completed EISs 1 (2011), available at http://energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/NEPA-Comprehensive_EIS_List_07_05_ 
11.pdf. 
1015 Id. at 1, 8. 
1016 See Calendar Years 2000-2007 Filed EISs, CEQ, http://ebookbrowse.com/ (search 
“Ebook Search Engine” for “CEQ calendar year”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). CEQ Reports 
for 2000 to 2007 are published online. Id. 
1017 Id. 
2012] NEPA & Resource Development in the Western United States 387 
annually than the DOE, with fifty-three being filed in the first nine 
months of 2011.1018 
 The DOE has classified its NEPA activity into six general catego-
ries, two of which, Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability and Fossil 
Energy, directly involve fossil fuel energy.1019 A third category, Energy 
Efficiency & Renewable Energy, also involves issues relevant to fossil 
fuel.1020 Since 2005, three EISs in the fossil fuel category, each in vari-
ous stages of processing by the DOE, concerned carbon capture and 
storage.1021 Most recent fossil fuel EISs evaluate projects that received 
funding through the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.1022 Five 
of six recent EISs were produced to support loan programs that involve 
fossil fuel energy; four of the six involve either integrated gasification 
combined cycle and coal or coal-to-liquid power production.1023 
 Beginning in 2004, the DOE filed thirty-three FEISs (excluding 
FERC EISs)1024—of which nine concerned nuclear issues, ten involved 
fossil fuel projects, and five were evaluations of transmission line pro-
posals.1025 In Utah, a state rich in energy resources, there has been one 
FEIS since 2007, and one PEIS that evaluated pipeline and electricity 
transmission energy corridors.1026 
 The BLM has produced 327 NEPA documents from January 2004 
to July 2011, 136 of which were FEISs.1027 Most of the FEISs were part of 
the BLM’s obligation to prepare resource management plans. About 
sixty FEISs were related to activities concerning energy develop-
ment.1028 Oil and gas operations accounted for about fifteen FEIS doc-
uments, solar development accounted for twelve, and coal leases ac-
                                                                                                                      
 
1018 Id. 
1019 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Schedules of Key EISs (2011), http://energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/Key_EIS_Schedule_January2012_1.pdf. 
1020 See id. 
1021 See id. 
1022 See id. 
1023 See id. 
1024 National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Impact Statement Database, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf (follow “Search for Specific 
EISs” hyperlink; then search “Word Search” for “Final EIS,” search “date” from “01/01/ 
2004,” select “Department of Energy” for “Agency”; then follow “Submit Search” hyper-
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counted for seven.1029 Approximately half the energy related FEISs 
dealt with electric power transmission lines, wind and geothermal de-
velopment, mining, and oil shale.1030 The number of FEISs is surpris-
ingly small. In Utah the BLM controls over 43% of the land in the state 
and has the mineral rights to over 67% of the state.1031 However, from 
2004 through mid-2011, the BLM produced eleven FEIS documents 
covering its actions in Utah, seven of which were part of its resource 
management plans.1032 In addition, Utah was covered by four PEISs.1033 
 The federal government does not produce EISs and EAs in the 
quantity that would appear to be required by the judicial interpreta-
tions defining a major federal action. Nevertheless, the EISs that are 
prepared are frequently remanded for failing to comply with the stat-
ute’s requirements. Parts II, III, and IV of this Article discusses sixteen 
Court of Appeals decisions involving NEPA compliance in cases involv-
ing energy issues. The federal government lost nine of these cases.1034 





1030National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Impact Statement Database, supra note 
1024. 
1031 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Mineral and Surface Acres Administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management, Fiscal Year 2010 tbl. 1-3 (2010), available at http://www. 
blm.gov/public_land_statistics/pls10/pls1-3_10.pdf (calculations by the author). 
1032 Id. 
1033 National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Impact Statement Database, supra note 
1024. 
1034 Cal. Wilderness v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the DOE did not meet its NEPA obligation to consult with the States, and improperly 
failed to prepare an EIS or EA); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding in favor of the Forest Service and BLM); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Dept. of the Interior, 623 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding against BLM because no hard 
look was taken in preparing the EIS); S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. District v. FERC, 621 F.3d 
1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding FERC’s 250 page EIS as meeting NEPA’s requirements); 
Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 608 F.3d 709 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(ruling in favor of the government and holding that phased development was not required 
to be analyzed by the BLM under NEPA because it is impractical and would not meet the 
project’s purpose of the statute); Te-Moak Tribe of Nev. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 608 
F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling against BLM because the cumulative impact analysis and 
the avoidance and mitigation requirements were inadequate); S. Fork Band v. U.S. Dept. 
of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009) (ruling against BLM because the cumulative 
impacts analysis, as well as other aspects of NEPA’s requirements, were inadequate); New 
Mexico v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that BLM loses 
because it did not prepare a site-specific EIS based on an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009); Alaska Wilderness 
League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding against the DOI (MMS) be-
cause they did not take a hard look at the impact on whales, fish, or impact of spills, and 
provided inadequate mitigation measures); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 
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 If environmentalists target energy development with the same liti-
gation strategy that is being used to target fossil fuel projects based on 




(9th Cir. 2007) (upholding that the EIS approved the use of a partial injunction that al-
lowed a phased development to proceed at the same time as BLM prepared a SEIS on a 
phased development plan); Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(finding against Forest Service because no hard look was taken and there was no discus-
sion of the no action alternative); N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (finding in favor of BLM because multi-stage projects do not require site-specific 
analysis in the first stage of a project); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
377 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding against BLM because it had not made an adequate 
site-specific environmental review nor had it addressed the magnitude of water production 
from CBM extraction and the critical air quality issues); Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. 
FERC, 373 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding in favor of the DOE (FERC) because the 
EIS met the hard look requirement and the EIS covered the elements required by NEPA); 
Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding for NRC and EPA 
because the issues were not ripe and there is a statutory bar to NEPA review). 
1035 See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40 En-
vtl. L. 1261 (2010); Reitze, supra note 871. 
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